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Abstract 
 
The current degree of globalization that characterizes most of the world’s modern markets has 
created a fertile ground for the advent of focused, multinational groups of companies. The complexity 
of these entities presents itself both as a remarkable achievement in sociological terms but also gives 
way to new and challenging aspects that human rationality must explore, counting on its inherent 
curiosity. In this context, this thesis makes an attempt to tackle the problem of valuing multinational 
firms and providing a possible outcome to a hypothesized merger between two global players in the 
luxury sector: LVMH and Hermès.  
The goal that this work proposes to achieve includes an analysis of both companies financial 
history, coupled with forecasted future performance and valuation as a means to infer on the potential 
synergetic effects that might arise from a merger. This is done by using methodologies that follow 
state of the art valuation approaches and are heavily supported by economic and financial theory, 
while still recognized by the top practitioners working in the areas of corporate finance and investment 
analysis. 
The outcome of this study has yielded mainly two conclusions: the fact that, by the end of 
2010, both Hermès and LVMH’s stock seem to be overvalued by the market and that a merger would 
effectively give way to the creation of synergies, thus making it a sensible decision in economic and 
financial terms. In this sense, the share prices of LVMH and Hermès have been estimated at €118,83 
and €126,26 per share, respectively, while the value of synergies was found to be approximately €10B. 
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Glossary 
€xxB xx Billions of Euros (1B = 1.000M) 
€xxM xx Millions of Euros 
APV Adjusted Present Value 
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CFROI Cash-flow return on investment 
DCF Discounted cash flow 
EBIT Earnings before interest and tax 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
EBT Earnings before tax 
EVA Economic Value Added 
Hermès Hermès group of companies 
IRR Internal rate of return 
KPI Key performance indicators 
LVMH Louis Vuitton Moët Henessy group of companies 
M&A Mergers and acquisitions 
MBO Management buy-out 
NPV Net present value 
p.p. percentage points 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
xxk xx thousands 
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1. Introduction 
 
The current economic environment among the developed nations, still living in the aftermath 
of an unprecedented financial crisis, and the emancipation of emerging economies, which are trying to 
become future economic powers, paints the scenery in which large multinational Groups such as 
LVMH and Hermès are navigating whilst in pursuit of their business goals. In this context, the 
objective of this thesis is to analytically study the effects of a possible merger between the two 
aforementioned companies in a financial perspective, while arriving at conclusive valuation values and 
other relevant findings along the way. 
This work is divided in the following sections: literature review, companies’ and industry 
overview, financial statement forecasts and assumptions, valuation results and conclusions and the 
analysis of the proposed acquisition.  
In the literature review, modern valuation techniques will be presented and explored in order 
to highlight their advantages and disadvantages, whilst background on specific merger and acquisition 
theory will also be mentioned. In the following section, LVMH and Hermès will be qualitatively and 
quantitatively presented, focusing on their main business areas, market influence and past financial 
and market performance. This exercise helps to conduct the financial statements forecasting efforts 
made in the next section, which will also depend on inputs from external sources and a degree of 
macroeconomic examination and assumptions. Subsequently, using the results of each company 
forecasts, an attempt is made in order to achieve at an individual share price for each entity and to 
determine what differences in value arise from a merged entity without synergies versus one 
considering synergy effects. In the final section, particular transaction details will be discussed and an 
opinion formed on how to conduct the acquisition, pondering on whether to offer cash or stock and on 
how the payment medium will be financed. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction to valuation 
Why is “value” important? According to Luehrman (1997) how a company estimates value is 
a critical determinant of how it allocates resources. It comes without saying that proper resource 
allocation has a significant impact on a firm’s overall performance. In its turn, Damodaran (2002) 
states that every asset has a value, and the key to successfully investing and managing assets lies in 
understanding not only what the value is, but also its sources. As such, many modern valuation 
approaches aim at providing the best valuation estimates possible while also supplying some insight as 
to what drives that value, where it comes from and what can be done to maximize it, while minimizing 
risks. Following Damodaran (2005), there are four general approaches to valuation: discounted cash-
flow valuations, liquidation and accounting valuation, relative valuation and contingent claim 
valuation. Moreover, every different variation of these approaches can be inclined to an equity or an 
enterprise perspective, where one tries to achieve a value for equity considerations and the other looks 
for an enterprise value for the company as a whole. While every one of these approaches values assets 
through a different lens, they are all bounded by underlying assumptions which can differ from 
approach to approach but that make each one best suited for a certain type of situation. 
2.2. Discounted cash-flow valuations 
Discounted cash flow (“DCF”) valuation relies on the assumption that an assets value resides 
in the ability it has to generate future benefits. In other words, its value comes from the expected cash-
flows it generates. An important feature of this approach resides on the notion of present value, as first 
mentioned by Alfred Marshall and Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk (1907) and further explored by Irving 
Fisher (1907, 1930), whereby the time preference people have for capital now, and the investment 
opportunity principle that capital invested now will yield greater income in the future, is an important 
consideration in establishing the value of an asset. In broad terms, a DCF analysis considers that the 
value of a business equals its future expected cash-flows discounted to the present at an appropriate 














where the Present Value (“PV”) is calculated by the sum of all expected future Cash Flows 
(“E(CF)”) for the period t divided by one plus the applicable discount rate k to the power of t. In this 
sense, the estimate of expected future cash flows is a crucial aspect of DCF analysis. As such, it will 
be estimated an “explicit period” of cash flows where particular effects on growth can be considered, 
which is particularly relevant in fast growing or young firms, and a “constant growth” period, which 
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assumes the firm has reached the end of its abnormal growth potential and will evolve at a constant 
pace from then on. Based on Jennergren (2008), the explicit period can be regarded as a period of 
transition, occurring during a turn-around or after a take-over, while the constant growth period is 
characterized by steady-state development. As far as the constant growth period is concerned, Koller, 
Goedhart and Wessels (2005) state that the explicit period should be long enough so that in the last 
year the company’s growth rate is less than or equal to that of the economy. In this sense, they 
recommend 10 to 15 years of explicit period forecasts. 
Fernandez (1999) states that the four most common DCF valuation approaches include the 
free cash-flow discounted at the weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”), cash flow to equity 
holders discounted at the return on the equity flows, capital cash flow discounted at the WACC before 
taxes, and Adjusted Present Value (“APV”). In line with modern trends in valuation models, 
Damodaran (2002) further distinguishes DCF models between total cash-flow and excess cash-flow 
whereby the former focuses on all cash-flows generated while the later considers that only cash-flows 
generated in excess of the required return are value creating cash-flows. Examples of mechanisms that 
rely on this type of model are Economic Value Added (“EVA”) and cash flow return on investment 
(“CFROI”). As proposed by Bennett Stewart (1991), to calculate EVA operating profits must be netted 
from the cost of capital employed to produce those earnings and discounted in order to determine what 
excess return is being generated by current capital outlays. This methodology is faithful to the Net 
present value (“NPV”) principle that states a project should be undertaken if it presents a positive 
NPV. CFROI however is based on the internal rate of return (“IRR”) rationale but considers the gross 
investment and the life of the assets as the discounting horizon, therefore comprising past cash flows, 
serving also a useful tool to determine if a firm is deploying its assets well. 
 Due to the multinational, multibusiness nature of the companies considered in this paper, 
following Damodaran’s (2009) suggestion, DCF methodologies will be used to determine the 
individual and joint values of both Hermès and LVMH, as these types of companies present the same 
variables that determine the value of any company (cash flows, the expected growth rate, how risky 
the assets are and the period of time before the firm becomes a stable growth firm). In this sense, the 
FCFF and APV methodologies will be used, given that the first is a well known and used methodology 
in the professional financial services industry and provides an estimate of value from an operational 
standpoint, while the second helps distinguish the contribution of side effects and financing options in 
the outcome (Myers, 1974). Additionally, relative valuation will also be applied in order to 
complement the other estimates and provide a market sourced perspective. It is also worth mentioning 
that being these companies large multinationals working in different sectors, due consideration must 
given to the applicability of valuation methodologies to these situations. 
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2.3. Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) can be defined as the cost of different 
components of a firm’s financial structure weighted by their market value proportions (Damodaran, 
2002). In other words, it is the company’s opportunity cost of funds as a whole, representing a blend 
of the returns required by the company’s debt and equity holders. It is one of the most used rates at 
which future cash flows are discounted to the present, in particular cash flows to the firm. The basic 
intuition for the use of this rate derives from the fact that free cash flows to the firm are available to all 
investors, thus they must comprise the risks borne by all of them (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 











 )1(  
Hence, dk constitutes the cost of debt which is then weighted by the proportion of debt D in 
the total value of the company ED , while in similar terms ek represents the cost of equity, in its 
turn also weighted by the amount of equity E in the firm’s total value. It is also assumed that the 
proportions of debt and equity are given in market values. Furthermore, note the term T , which refers 
to the marginal tax rate of the firm and serves to capture the positive effect of the tax shields deriving 
from debt financing, not accounted for in the determination of the free cash flows. According to the 
aforementioned authors, the effect of debt tax shielding is not directly considered in the free cash flow 
determination so that comparability of cash flows can be maintained between companies and a clearer 
focus on operating performance can be achieved. 
In spite this WACC methodology is used by most companies as their workhorse valuation 
approach (Luehrman, 1997), there are a few drawbacks inherent to the formula presented which limit 
flexibility and ultimately can lead to significantly skewed results. First of all it assumes a target and 
constant debt to equity ratio, which is rather restrictive, as it is not the reality faced by many 
companies. Luehrman (1997) raises the issue that the WACC formula relies on the term )1( T to 
capture the entire effect of tax shields, thus comprising a big risk of error if their value is not perfectly 
estimated. In this sense, Fernandez (2007) also states that the correct calculation of the WACC rests on 
a correct valuation of the tax shields.  
A lot of discussion concerning the correct definition and limitations of the WACC is present in 
theoretical literature. Farbera, Gilletb and Szafarz (2006) arrive at a general formula for the WACC 
that remains valid for any debt structure, either if we assume a constant debt level (implying that the 
required return of tax shields is equal to the return on debt dk ) as Modigliani and Miller first devised 
in their seminal paper, or if we assume a constant debt ratio, (implying that the required return of tax 
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shields is equal to the opportunity cost of capital ak ) as proposed by Miles and Ezzel (1980) and 
Harris and Pringle's (1985) models. On the other hand Fernandez (2007) argues that while the Farbera, 
Gilletb and Szafarz’s general formula is correct in the event that the required returns are always 
constant, such as under the Modigliani and Miller assumption, it is not possible to derive a debt policy 
such that the appropriate discount rate for the tax shields equals ak in all periods. Ultimately, the 
WACC formula could be reassessed every period to make up for a changing capital structure, but as 
Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005) suggest, in these cases an alternative method such as adjusted 
present value would be better. 
Despite rather intuitive in nature, the WACC gives way to other problems of implementation, 
mostly linked to the distinction between book values and market values (Farber, Gillet, and Szafarz, 
2006). For these and other reasons some authors might even go as far as saying that nowadays the 
WACC standard is obsolete (Luehrman, 1997) when compared to other tools that, with present 
computational capacity, provide better tailored approaches to the valuation of different types of assets. 
2.4. Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
The free cash flow to the firm (“FCFF”) method uses the free cash flows generated by the 
firm, consisting in cash generated by its operations, after paying operational taxes, after expenditures 
for additional working capital and after capital expenditures (Jennergren, 2008). Thus, free cash flows 
are computed according to estimates of expected future earnings and the future cash flows principle, as 
described in section 2.2, is then applied, considering the WACC as the discount rate in order to obtain 
the present value of all cash flows. As the firm’s operations are assumed to continue indefinitely, we 
must also account for cash flows not comprised in the explicit estimates and hence assume future 
operations will grow at a given rate. For this purpose, the Gordon growth model will be used, as the 





 1  
Where the Terminal Value, TV , is the result of the 1FCFF for the following year, divided by 
the difference between the discount rate, WACC , and the constant growth rate g . 
The sum of explicit and constant growth periods’ discounted cash flows results in the firm 
value. To this amount, debt must be deducted in order to conclude on a value for equity, as follows 
from the definition of firm value given by the sum of debt plus equity. 
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2.5. Adjusted Present Value 
Adjusted Present Value (“APV”) while similar to WACC based methodologies because it also 
relies on valuing assets in place through future cash flows, intentionally separates financial strategies 
from operations and consequently adds the business fraction of the DCF analysis (Luehrman, 1997). 
This approach was first presented by Stewart Myers (1974) and proposes the valuation of the financial 
dimension separately from the business’ in an attempt to surpass the underlying assumptions and 
limitations inherent to a WACC approach, whilst providing clear information on what portion of that 
value comes from business or financial determinants. The first framework presented by Myers, 
however, stated only that the value of the levered firm equals the value of the company with no debt, 
plus the present value of tax saving (Fernandez, 1999). According to Damodaran (2002) this definition 
is incomplete as it discards the importance of bankruptcy costs, a detail also omitted by most 
practitioner of the APV methodology, in particular considering levels of debt where those costs are 
clearly different than zero. In this sense, a more formal definition of APV is then: 

































With )(FCFFE  being the free cash flow to the firm, uk the unlevered cost of equity and 
ug the growth rate of free cash flows in perpetuity. 




























tD stands for the total amount of debt and is multiplied by the cost of debt, dk , and the firm’s 
marginal tax rate ct . Notice that the formula includes a component for the Terminal Value, dTV , of 
the tax shields. This is a reasonable assumption if the tax shields are expected to grow at a rate dg , 
requiring that the firm refinances its debt as its future cash flows grow (Luehrman, 1997). 
Bankruptcy costs estimation: 
BCPV ab   
The present value of bankruptcy costs bPV , is determined by the product of the probability of 
bankruptcy, a , and the total amount of those costs, BC . As abovementioned, under the present 
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framework bankruptcy costs must also be computed. Their calculation, however, presents a significant 
estimation problem. Damodaran (2002) suggests that the probability of bankruptcy can be determined 
by estimating a bond rating and using empirical probabilities of default for bonds with similar default 
probabilities. Bankruptcy costs on the other hand, are more subjective by nature, as they comprise 
direct and indirect effects. In this sense Damodaran cites a Warner study of railroad bankruptcies, 
where the direct costs amount to approximately 5% of firm value, while Brealey and Myers (2000) are 
supported by an Andrade and Kaplan (1998) study of a sample of troubled and highly leveraged firms, 
concluding on 10 to 20 percent of pre-distress market value estimated costs. 
Another key aspect of APV valuation, and one that is not generally consensual in academia, is 
what discount rate to use for the tax shields (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 2000). It can be argued that 
the company’s ability to obtain the tax shields is mostly tied to the rate at which creditors are willing 
to lend money to the company, but concurrently the point can also be made that the unlevered cost of 
equity should be used, given the uncertainty of future shielding and the fact that tax shields are highly 
correlated with the firm’s cash flows. Delving further in this issue, Fernandez (2007) builds on the 
defendants of the cost of debt approach such as Modigliani and Miller (1963), Myers (1974), Brealey 
and Myers (2000) and Damodaran (2006), as well as the proponents of the unlevered cost of equity, 
such as Harris and Pringle (1985) and Ruback (2002), to conclude that the value of tax shields depends 
on the debt policy of the firm, stating that when there is a fixed amount of debt, the cost of debt should 
be used, as opposed to when a leverage ratio is fixed at market value, which calls for a Miles and 
Ezzell (1985) perspective, discounting tax shields at the cost of debt for the first year and at the 
unlevered cost of equity from then on. 
2.6. Risk parameters 
In order to determine the price of an asset, fundamental economic theory provides the price 
setting model of supply and demand that serves as a foundation to all market based interaction 
between economic agents, the capital assets market being no exception. The current standard model 
for assessing an asset’s risk and return relationship is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) 
(Damodaran, 2002) and as such this will be the model used in this thesis. Much of this model is 
accredited to Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), in particular due to their contribution of introducing a 
riskless asset and its implications on the investment choices. 
The general assumptions on which the CAPM relies are as follows: there are no transactions 
costs, all assets are traded, investments are infinitely divisible and there are no asymmetries of 
information (therefore no under or over-valued assets can be found). Consequently, the intuition of the 
CAPM comes from the fact that the ideal market portfolio would be a combination of all assets traded 
on the market. This is not a striking conclusion, knowing that with no transaction and monitoring 
costs, agents, while trying to diversify as much as they can in order to mitigate specific risk, will 
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eventually hold all assets available in the market. Another relevant aspect of the problem is investor’s 
preference for risk. This factor is captured by the introduction of a riskless asset in which investors can 
allocate resources (such as a treasury bill with a certain return on investment) and also by the ability to 
borrow at that same riskless rate. Under these circumstances investors reflect their risk preferences in 
determining the proportion between the market portfolio and the riskless asset held. 
In order to measure the risk of a particular asset, the model suggests measuring the risk that 
asset adds to the market portfolio. Hence, this approach will only capture the market risk component 
of the asset, while the specific risk will dilute to inexistence alongside the market portfolio. The 
logical conclusion follows that the amount of risk added to the overall portfolio must be equal to the 
market risk brought by the particular asset. Accordingly, this effect is captured by the covariance of 
the asset to the market portfolio, and the model requires a standardization of covariance in order to 






   
The name given to the result of the standardization procedure is the asset “beta”. This equals 
the covariance between the asset and the market portfolio, im , divided by the market variance, 
2
m . 
By this standard, assets which are riskier than the market will have betas above 1, while less risky 
assets will present betas below 1. Thus, an asset with a beta of zero is riskless in this sense. Beta, 
therefore, measures the marginal contribution of a stock to the risk of the market portfolio (Brealey 
and Meyers, 2003). As defined herein, beta is not independent of the underlying capital structure of an 
asset. Modigliani and Miller (1963) were among the first to hint the relationship between the 
unleveraged and leveraged beta, which is much alike their renowned Proposition II, but instead uses 
betas in the place of expected returns: 
E
D
daae )(    
The equity beta, e , is thus dependent on the difference between the asset and debt beta, 
)( da   , weighted by the debt to equity ratio and finally added to the asset beta. The key 
implication of this relationship is that while financial leverage does not affect the risk or the expected 
return on the firm’s assets, a rise in riskiness of equity is witnessed. 
From this point on, the fact that the riskiness of an asset is linearly related to its beta allows for 
the expected return for an individual asset to be written as: 
 fmifi RRERRE  )()(   
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where the expected return of asset i , )( iRE , equals the risk free rate, fR , added to the asset 
beta, i , times the market premium over the riskless rate, fm RRE )( . In this formulation, three key 
inputs are necessary: i) the asset’s beta, already defined above, and two other that are common to all 
companies in the same market, ii) the risk free rate and the iii) market premium. 
i) The asset beta 
The estimation of company betas is yet another topic of discussion among theorists and 
practitioners. Because betas cannot be directly observed in the market, regression models are often 
applied to historical data in order to estimate it. Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005) declare that the 
most common regression model relies on studying the stock’s return against changes in the market 
return. Furthermore, the measurement interval of data to be used depends on the practitioner. Black, 
Jensen and Scholes (1972), advocate using five years of monthly data, while also suggesting grouping 
individual asset betas in order to estimate an unbiased beta of the portfolio. The five year period is also 
supported by Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2002) as accuracy of estimation is lost with too few 
observations, while a longer period might capture external effects on firms’ activity (for example a 
shift in industry of activity). Brealey and Meyers, (2003) also sustain that estimation of betas of 
portfolios should be done as a whole, as errors tend to cancel out in this case. That is why financial 
managers often turn to industry betas. 
ii) Risk free rate 
The risk free rate is normally based on government long term, “risk free” bonds. In spite this 
being the industry standard, Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005) declare that ideally, each cash flow 
should be discounted using a similar maturity bond. Regarding the nature of cash-flows to be 
discounted, Damodaran (2002) proposes using a risk free rate that is denominated in the same 
currency of those cash-flows, as opposed to the risk free rate of the company’s country of domicile. In 
the case of a non-existent government body which offers a risk free (i.e. no probability of default) 
bond, he provides three solutions: i) looking at the largest and safest firm in that market for its long-
term borrowing rate and choosing a marginally lower value, ii) using interest rate parity equilibrium to 
determine the implied risk free rate if there are dollar denominated forward contracts on the country’s 
original currency, and iii) adjust local government borrowing rate with the default spread implied in 
the country’s rating. 
iii) Market premium 
The market premium is defined by the mark-up on the riskless rate that the market demands 
for a marginal increase in risk. Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005) state that it is seen as one of the 
most debated issues in finance and no particular model of estimation can claim widespread 
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acceptance. They do, however, put forward that by 2003, the market risk premium was marginally 
below 5 percent. Notwithstanding, there is consensus that the estimation of this mark-up should use 
historical data, although the values used by practitioners vary greatly, from 4 percent to 12 percent 
(Damodaran, 2002). Empirical studies have been made to the market risk premium, such as the ones 
conducted by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Seigel (1998). In the first case, the authors have 
concluded with a surprisingly high rate of return of stocks versus short-term government securities, 
inferring that investors are very risk averse, while in the second case the author postulates that 
historical risk premiums may be significantly lower than what was previously though, and closer to 
current practice for that matter, averaging about 5,3 percent for the 1802 to 1999 period. 
Although widely used, the CAPM is still considered a rather imperfect model for determining 
prices in the capital market. Citing Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995), Fama and French (1996) 
advocate that size also contributes to the average return explanation provided by the asset beta. This is 
the case made by Brealey and Meyers (2003), when they compared value stocks with growth stocks 
(defined as stocks with a high and low ratio of book to market value respectively) concluding that 
former stocks have provided a higher long-run return than the later. This conclusion hints that the asset 
beta is not the only reason that justifies differences in expected returns. But then again, the two authors 
also allow room for the justification that by looking hard at past data on stock performance, it is 
probable that some strategy could be found which would have worked in the past, but would have 
disappeared as soon as it was discovered, as the market would correct for that inconsistency. This 
seems to be the case given that in recent years, growth and value stocks have under-performed 
approximately as often as they have over-performed.  
Another criticism of the CAPM comes from the specific assumption that investors may 
borrow or lend any amounts of money at the riskless rate. Black (1972), states that this assumption is 
not a very good approximation for many investors and this would significantly change the model 
should it be relaxed. Furthermore, Roll (1977), adds that the CAPM cannot be tested empirically, as 
the market portfolio would need to contain every single possible available asset, (including stocks, 
bonds, commodities, real estate, etc.). 
As a final note on the issue of estimating the cost of equity, two other models concurrent to the 
CAPM must be mentioned, the Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM), which stipulates that the return on an 
asset is totally encompassed in a set of factors and a random noise, and the Fama and French (1992) 
Three Factor Model, which uses a regression of a stock’s excess returns on excess market returns, 
returns on small companies’ stock over big stocks and the excess return of high over low book to 
market stocks. 
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2.7. Relative Valuation 
Contrary to cash flow based valuation, which relies on a fundamental analysis of company 
historical financial statements in order to compute its intrinsic value, relative valuation uses 
comparable assets to establish benchmarks and through this way provide insight on whether a firm is 
under, or over, valued in relation to its peers.  The general concept thus requires the definition of two 
critical factors: choosing the basis for comparison (in other words selecting the peer group which will 
serve as reference) and the normalization of a common proxy of price, often embodied by a ratio 
(multiple), in order to make the comparison with similar assets possible
1
. The recourse to relative 
valuation is a common practice in the financial services industry. According to Damodaran (2002), 
almost all equity research and half of acquisition valuations use multiples. This is no surprise as a 
multiples approach can be completed far more quickly, and with fewer assumptions, than a DCF 
valuation. Additionally, multiples are easier to understand and therefore are more presentable to 
clients, also supported by the argument that they tend to reflect the current mood of the market. 
Multiples used in relative valuation can be calculated from various sources, whether 
accounting measures, such as earnings and book values, or other values less related to book-keeping, 
such as revenue or sector specific multiples. The current practice in the financial services industry, 
however, tends to choose particular multiples in detriment of others. In this regard, a study carried out 
by Fernandez (2001) to the investment bank Morgan Stanley in Europe, concludes that the most used 
multiples are price to earnings ratios and EV/EBITDA. 
Albeit much more immediate in nature, valuations using multiples present some drawbacks 
that require closer reflection. This is the case even with professionals in the finance industry, as some 
analysts are confused about what price–earnings ratios really mean and often use the ratios in odd 
ways (Brealey and Myers, 2003). In many cases, they use an industry average price to earnings ratio to 
compute a fair valuation according to a company’s earnings. However, Koller, Goedhart and Wessels 
(2005), state that the use of the industry average overlooks expected growth rates, returns on invested 
capital, and capital structures. In this respect, a recommendation put forward by Kim and Ritter (1999) 
suggests that the use of forecasted earnings in computing multiples improves the valuation accuracy 
substantially. This conclusion comes from their analysis of 142 initial public offerings, according to 
which multiples based on this type of earnings outperformed those based on historical earnings. 
Another study carried out by Baker and Ruback (1999) compares the relative performance of some 
earnings and revenues-based multiples and provides theoretical and empirical evidence that absolute 
valuation errors are proportional to value. Even so, other problems can arise from the fact that 
                                                     
1 Even though this describes the general approach, subsequent fine-tuning of the sample might be necessary in order to 
reconcile specific differences (e.g. different growth rates or capital structures) of each company so as to guarantee 
comparability. 
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multiples reflect the market mood which might be over, or under, valuing a particular industry for 
some reason. Furthermore, given that the underlying assumptions of multiples are often well hidden 
from investors, a partial financial advisor can feel more inclined to choose the multiples that better 
support his agenda. 
Another feature that also makes multiples attractive is the complementary perspective they 
provide to DCF analysis. Kaplan and Ruback, (1996) conducted an empirical study of 51 highly 
leveraged transactions and concluded that the most reliable estimates for the market values at which 
they occurred were those obtained by using DCF and multiples together. In spite the fact that, in their 
paper, both authors concluded that multiples resulted in more variability than DCF results, they did 
provide some additional explanatory power and recommend using both approaches if possible. In this 
sense, Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005) propose that they can help test the plausibility of cash 
flow forecasts, explain performance mismatches between a company and its competitors, and support 
insightful discussions on whether the company is strategically positioned to create more value than 
other industry peers. 
In conclusion, multiples can be helpful in aiding other types of valuation approaches (such as a 
DCF analysis) although knowledge of the potential pitfalls must be present while they are being 
calculated. If done right, they can even yield similar results to DCF models (Kaplan and Ruback, 
1996). 
 
2.8. Mergers and Acquisitions 
Searching for alternative ways to generate value other than from organic, day to day 
operations, in recent decades the contemporary economic and regulatory environment has proven to be 
suitable for firms that seek opportunities through the acquisition of, or merger with, other companies. 
Several reasons for the existence of mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) activity in developed 
economies have been put forward. In a way, if the regulatory framework and financial culture present 
in the economy is suitable, often M&A is an answer to conflicts of interest between a company’s 
stakeholders, acting as a force of market discipline. In this sense it is an ever present concern for a 
company’s management, as such compelling decision-makers to behave and adopt sensible decisions 
or face an increased probability of takeover by a rival firm. The case can also be made if managing 
directors find that, due to their experience, value can be added by directly owning company shares 
themselves and thus controlling some or all voting rights (frequently these situations lead to 
management buy outs (“MBO’s”), which make up a portion of M&A activity). Some companies 
pursue acquisitions as a complementary strategy to their core business. Reasons for such behaviour 
can reside in depleted organic growth opportunities, access to valuable synergies and economies of 
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scale (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983), diversifying to reduce risk, strategic considerations such as 
market consolidation, possibly by forming monopolies or oligopolies (Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford, 2001), or even as means to attain firm specific assets such as licenses, patents, etc. Other 
companies make the business of buying and selling shares their prime focus of activity. Such is the 
case of private equity firms, venture capitalist and even companies working in the financial services 
industry, which have specialized in helping other entities with M&A related issues.  
However, not all the reasons abovementioned for the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions 
benefit from consensus in theoretical literature. Grossman and Hart (1980) refute the possibility that if 
a firm underperforms due to bad management, it is more vulnerable to takeover bids. They argue that 
shareholders can free ride on a raiding firm, effectively limiting its potential profit. In their turn, Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe (2002) consider diversification is a bad motive for M&A given that, by itself, no 
increase in value is produced. They support that even though only unsystematic risk can be diversified 
away, investor can diversify much more effectively than firms by purchasing stock in other entities. 
Although there are several reasons for the existence of M&A, Kaplan (2000) conducted an in-depth 
case study of a small number of mergers, verifying that a general patterns emerge: most M&A are 
associated with technological or regulatory shocks, a view that is also shared by Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996). 
According to Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2002), three legal procedures can be distinguished 
as ways a company can acquire another: i) merger or consolidation, ii) acquisition of stock and iii) 
acquisition of assets. 
i) Merger or consolidation 
In a merger the acquiring firm absorbs another company’s assets and liabilities. In this case the 
acquirer’s name and identity remain, as the target permanently ceases to exist as an independent entity. 
A merger must also be approved by the target’s board of directors and consequently voted favourably 
by the target shareholders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). In a consolidation, both the acquirer and the 
target merge and are deemed legally extinct in their previous configurations in order to create a 
newfound entity. In this situation, the stockholders of each firm receive stock of the new firm. 
ii) Acquisition of stock 
The direct acquisition of stock through a tender offer is yet another method of takeover, 
whether in exchange for cash, equity or other securities. A tender offer is a public offer to buy the 
outstanding stock of another firm at a specific price. In this sense, the acquirer seeks to publicise its 
intention directly to the target’s shareholders, effectively bypassing its management and board of 
directors. For this reason, tender offers are used to carry out hostile takeovers (Damodaran, 2002). In 
these situations minority shareholder can sometimes refuse to tender thus preventing the target from 
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being completely absorbed. When this is not the case, however, many acquisitions of stock end up 
being a formal merger. 
iii) Acquisition of assets 
A final category of M&A consists in the acquisition of a firm’s assets. By buying the assets, 
the acquiring firm does not need to deal with minority shareholders, even though transferring the title 
of assets can be costly. 
Damodaran (2002) makes one more distinction of the types of M&A. He postulates that the 
firm can also be acquired by its management or a group of investors, sometimes changing from public 
to private hands. Acquisitions in this sense can be called management buy-outs if managers are 
involved, or leveraged buy-outs in case the funding comes from debt.
2
 
Besides the types of acquisitions defined above, a classification can also be made in relation to 
the industry of both bidder and target, namely if it is a horizontal, vertical or conglomerate acquisition. 
If a firm acquires another in the same industry, effectively buying out a former competitor, the 
acquisition is said to be horizontal while if the target firm is in the same industry, but focuses on a 
different step of the production process, the acquisition is said to be vertical. If both firms are not 
related in terms of industry, the acquisition is reckoned as a conglomerate acquisition. 
Concerning the specific case tackled in this thesis, which is to assess the financial implications 
arising from a possible combination between LVMH and Hermès, it must be mentioned that, by 31 
December 2010, LVMH already owned 20.2% of Hermès share capital. This significant portion was 
acquired mostly through the settlement of equity linked swaps already in LVMH possession. Although 
relevant, based on past acquisitions the scenario studied herein will assume a tender offer for the 
remainder of Hermès’ shares by LVMH. 
2.9. M&A and value creation 
A long-lasting topic of discussion amongst theorists is concerned with to which extent M&A 
processes create value as a whole (i.e. in aggregate terms). In this sense several empiric and analytical 
studies have been conducted in the past, each trying to shed some light on the value effects of M&A 
activity. Overall, conclusions brought by those studies still diverge significantly.  
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003) examine a sample of 12.023 acquisitions by public 
firms from 1980 to 2001. They conclude that acquisitions announcements are associated with a 
                                                     
2 Other types of takeover procedures exist that do not involve the direct acquisition of a company, such as proxy contests, where certain 
shareholders try to gain controlling seats on the board of directors by electing representatives through the help of proxies, which are sought 
from other shareholders and give the proxy holder the right to vote on their behalf in the shareholder’s meeting. 
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decrease in aggregate shareholder wealth. However, this is only the case if a large firm is the acquirer, 
whereas considering only acquisitions by small firms, shareholders gain in the aggregate. In this sense, 
they propose that the most important variable in explaining variation in value creation is the size of the 
acquiring firm, stipulating that large firms tend to have more agency problems which lead them to 
make bad decisions. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) on the other hand, look more closely to 
stock market responses to mergers and find that it is positive for the combined parties. Jarrell, 
Brickley, and Netter (1988), approach the issue from a possible redistribution effect of mergers. They 
question the assumption that gains to shareholders are mere wealth transfers from other stakeholders 
(bondholders, employees, etc.), and determine that is not the case, as almost no empirical evidence 
exist to sustain such hypothesis. Therefore, gains to shareholders must be real economic gains 
obtained from the efficient rearrangement of resources. Even if the aggregate balance of M&A is 
positive between bidder and seller, Jensen and Ruback (1983) say  that evidence suggests the target’s 
shareholders benefit from the transaction, while the acquirer’s shareholders do not lose, a conclusion 
also supported by Mitchell and Lehn (1990). Concerning effective operational returns, Healy, Palepu, 
and Ruback (1992) examine post-merger operating performance for the 50 largest mergers between 
1979 and 1984 and verify that merged entities witness improvements in asset productivity, conducing 
to higher operating cash flows than their industry peers. In the same sense, after surveying existing 
research on the area of M&A effectiveness, Bruner (2004) concludes that M&A clearly pay for the 
shareholders of target firms, while most studies on the combined result of bidder and target present a 
positive net value. 
Although the studies abovementioned seek to ascertain the potential value creation of M&A, 
some authors propose post merger announcement returns may not be entirely related to the merger 
itself. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003), for instance, suggest the market can learn about a 
firm’s internal growth opportunities and react negatively if more appealing organic growth prospects 
were expected. As a result, these types of effects might be enough to justify negative announcement 
returns even if a merger bears a positive net present value. Another consideration that must be 
mentioned is the type of payment used to complete a merger. Be it cash or stock, this factor was also 
found to be indicative of post-merger returns, as studied by Loughran and Vijh (1997). By looking at 
947 acquisitions during 1970 and 1989, they concluded that cash based mergers have greater returns 
than mergers paid in stock. 
2.10. Synergies 
One major reason for the occurrence of M&A derives from the benefits brought by the 
synergies created. Synergy can be defined as the potential additional value that arises from combining 
two firms (Damodaran, 2002). Many times synergies justify the seemingly inflated premiums in 
corporate acquisitions. In their turn, the sources of synergies depend on the strategies and capabilities 
of a company (e.g. if an firm is the most efficient player in an industry, a merger with another 
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company will likely improve the second’s return on invested capital, whilst if the strategy is to 
consolidate several small companies, cost reductions are the most immediate synergies to attain) 
(Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002). 
According to academic literature, the potential additional value emerging from a combination 
of firms has to come from operational or financial sources. Within those areas, synergies can be 
divided in the following classifications: revenue enhancement, cost efficiency, tax benefits, and lower 
cost of capital. Revenue enhancement synergies refer to the advantages from sharing functional 
strengths (marketing capabilities for example can be shared in order to increase sales in a combined 
firm), from potential strategic benefits and from market power increases, resulting from reduced 
competition and higher market share. Cost efficiency is another probable benefit: economies of scale 
allow downsizing average production costs, complementary resources can be shared, or even increased 
efficiency can be reached from switching to more competent management. Tax benefits are somewhat 
more immediate synergies. They can be in the form of deductible tax losses, underused debt capacity 
or the employment of surplus funds. Debt capacity can increase due to more stability and predictability 
in operating cash-flows, while if a firm has surplus funding and is confronted with the choice of 
paying out dividends, buying back stock or acquiring another firm, the latter option often bears the less 
tax implications. Furthermore, on a financial point of view, a lower cost of capital can be reached as 
the cost of issuing securities (both debt and equity) is also subject to economies of scale. In addition to 
these types of synergies, the market attributes significant importance to other more questionable 
sources of synergetic advantages. These include earnings accretion and the diversification effects. 
Citing Sirower and Sahni (2006): “[...] short-term earnings accretion to the acquirer remains one of the 
most popular thresholds in judging whether or not to do a deal.” Earnings accretion basically means an 
increase of earnings per share of the acquiring firm that comes from the acquisition of firms with 
lower price to earnings ratios. As for the effects of diversifying to reduce risk, it is argued that more 
efficient diversification benefits can be gathered if investors individually diversify through traded 
stocks, as transaction costs are lower and price premiums are not weighing on stock prices. 
In many past M&A processes very large premiums were paid on account of synergies. In this 
sense a key issue in analysing M&A opportunities resides on effectively estimating the value of those 
advantages. In practical terms, Damodaran (2005) recommends valuing the firms involved in the 
M&A process first as independent entities, then as a combined entity with no synergies and 
subsequently incorporate the expected impacts of synergies in a third valuation. Afterwards, according 
to Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2002), the reasoning behind overall estimation of synergies is the 
difference between the value of the combined firm ABV  and the sum of the values of the separate firms 
)( BA VV  , such that:  
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)( BAAB VVVSynergy   
As abovementioned, M&A history has witnessed large acquisition premiums being paid to 
selling shareholders. Since acquisition premiums are many times based on synergy potential, it is safe 
to assume that by paying a significant mark-up on the stock value of a company, bidders are 
effectively compensating sellers for synergies. The proposition made by Damodaran (2005) to think 
about the way synergy gains are shared acknowledges that they depend on specific attributes of both 
acquiring and target firms, and thus the division of synergy value must be tied to the uniqueness of the 
strengths the acquirer possesses and which are necessary to realize those synergies. It is this 
relationship that eventually determines the bargaining power of both parties in the negotiation process. 
On a more practical note about synergies and their importance in the M&A market, there are a 
few common mistakes bidding firms make that lead them to overpaying in a transaction. Rock (1986) 
postulates a winners curse is present when a company overestimates potential synergies in a bidding 
process which leads it to offer the highest price. Since the offer price is inflated and is not based on 
value creation, the winning bid will be overstated. Grossman and Hart (1980) in their turn focus on a 
free-rider problem that exists in the presence of minority shareholders. When minority stakes cannot 
easily be bough-out after a takeover, those shareholders benefit from a combined entity with higher 
value if the price paid to shareholders who tendered did not comprise the whole value of synergies. 
This implies that shareholders will have no incentive to tender and, to convince them to sell, all 
synergy value must be paid. Finally, Roll (1986) looks at the human side of acquisitions and finds that 
often the acquirer’s management overestimates its ability to generate and capture synergies and thus 
pay too much for their targets, a proposition he calls the “hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers”. 
2.11. Payment methods 
After synergies have been accounted for and an overall value has been settled, the last step of 
the bidding package relies on choosing the appropriate payment method. Industry standard methods 
are mainly cash or equity payments and choosing one over the other is an important decision given 
each presents advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore a combination of methods can also be used 
and cash can be raised by issuing debt or equity, hence providing a wider offer of forms of payment. 
A review of studies concerning the impact of payment choice on market value of companies 
can provide some insight on the variables at play when making a payment decision. Faccio and 
Masulis (2005) study the European M&A market between 1997 and 2000 and realise that bidding 
shareholders with weak controlling positions in the acquiring company are more hesitant in using 
equity payments over cash. However they also find that stock financing is gradually more employed 
when measures of their own financial condition deteriorate. Martin (1996) examined the motives 
behind the choices of payment methods in M&A and concluded that stock payments are more likely if 
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the target firm presents more growth opportunities. While the same effect also happens with the 
increase in pre-acquisition stock returns of the acquiring firm, cash is more likely to be used when the 
acquirer has: i) more cash availability, ii) higher institutional shareholdings and blockholdings, and iii) 
in tender offers. 
In theory, making the decision between cash or stock must also take into account the following 
considerations: the availability of cash in hand, the perceived value of stock and the tax implications 
that each method entails (Damodaran, 2002). For some companies, cash has been accumulated over 
the course of time, justifying its use as payment method. The perceived value of stock, however, might 
benefit the use of equity in order to raise cash or as direct payment, in particular if the buyer’s 
management believes its own stock to be overvalued. In essence, the acquirer must weight if the risks 
and benefits of the deal should be shared with the target’s shareholders (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 
2005). If the acquirer desires target shareholders to remain involved in the company, a stock offer is 
best in transmitting that sentiment. On the contrary, a cash only payment withholds the future potential 
benefits of the merger in favour of the acquirers, given the target shareholders saw their interest in the 
company bought-out. 
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3. Company and Industry Overview 
 
3.1. Luxury market analysis 
Considering the current economic environment, in recent years the luxury goods industry has 
been clouded with uncertainty about its future. In theory, this effect is felt particularly in industries of 
this kind, bearing in mind the overall high income-price elasticity presented by consumers towards 
these types of products. Furthermore, according to a research report by Morgan Stanley, this industry 
is highly cyclical, as it is affected by consumer’s discretionary spending patterns. In this sense, 
designer labels are making efforts to reduce seasonality by introducing inter-seasonal collections, 
hence bridging the classic Spring/Summer and Autumn/Winter collections in an effort to reduce sales 
fluctuations. According to Savigny Partners, these inter-seasonal collections tend to offer more 
commercial pieces than the main collections, often with more sensible price tags, and consequently 
now account for the bulk of sales of fashion brands. 
Concerning industry size and performance, by January 14, 2011, the bespoke luxury industry 
tracking index “Savigny Luxury Index”
3
, reported a total market capitalization by share value of € 
182.120 M, whilst demonstrating a year-on-year price growth average of 62%. These values reflect 
various market forces and effects during 2010, explained by Savigny Partners as the result of strong 
sales growth across the sector, sustained benefits of cost control measures introduced during the crisis 
                                                     
3 The Savigny Luxury Index is an index promoted by the financial advisory company Savigny Partners, LLP which focuses on the luxury 
goods industry and tracks the stock of 14 major players: LVMH, Richemont, Swatch Group, PPR, Hermès, Coach, Luxottica, Ralph Lauren, 
Tiffany & Co, Burberry, Tod's Group, Bulgari, Ports and Safilo. 
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of the previous years and a fair amount of bid speculation. By that year’s end, Bain and Company 
produced a report on the recent developments and trends in the luxury goods industry for Altagamma, 
Italy’s trade association for the luxury industry. As can be witnessed in Figure 1, Bain & Co. estimates 
a 9,8% increase in market size from 2009 to 2010. In parallel, a relevant shift in weight by region is 
also seen, namely including a 2 p.p. increase of the Asia-Pacific markets, thanks to a 1 p.p. decrease in 
Japan and Europe. This trend is expected to continue, in particular with the prediction that China will 
become the third largest luxury market in the world within the next 5 years. As far as luxury categories 
are concerned, Figure 2 clearly shows 2 p.p increase of the Accessories segment, symmetric to the 
growth of the Perfume and cosmetics category. The remaining segments have retained their relative 
weights, thus allowing industry value to remain more or less well distributed between them. Another 
important distinction in this industry resides on the consumer gender distribution. In 2009, men 
accounted for about 38% of the market, while women remained the undisputed leaders in luxury 
spending with the remaining 62%. Overall, a general growth trend can be established in terms of 
regions and segments. The blooming economic development the Asia-Pacific region is currently 
experiencing and the deeper focus on already established luxury goods, such as bags and other 
accessories are the main drivers of the sector in the present moment. 
Historically, however, the luxury goods market has witnessed a bumpy performance in the 
past few years. Based on EIU information, the early 2000’s were disappointing, amidst terrorist 
attacks, a worldwide outbreak of SARS and the war in Iraq. Since 2004 until 2007, however, luxury 
customers regained the appetite for consumption, only to be again retracted by the financial crisis that 
surfaced a short distance down the road. This context made its way into 2009, when the market for 
luxury goods shrank by 8%. Only by the end of 2009 the industry started to regain its momentum, 
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which continued in 2010. Bain and Company’s report estimates a 10% growth in the personal luxury 
goods sector for that year, making it the true year of recovery for the industry. As far as the future is 
concerned, emerging markets are currently driving much of the growth in the luxury business. 
Concurrently, Savigny Partners state that a watchful eye must kept on menswear and internet sales, as 
men products are set to become a particularly interesting segment to explore in emerging countries, 
whilst the internet is simply not yet developed to its full potential in the fashion world.  
In conclusion, 2011 promises moderate growth prospects in the European region: the 
aforementioned Bain report predicts 3% to 5% increase in sales, negatively influenced by a strong 
Euro and an expected increase in taxes within the Euro area, as most manufacturers are French or 
Italian and governments are faced with large budget deficits to deal with. On the other hand, another 
view expressed in a recent report by Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research shows that the high 
levels of cash balances typically held by luxury companies will allow solid growth strategies, mainly 
driven by investments in new stores, which translate into increased revenues, mergers and acquisitions 
and increased payout to shareholders. That research also emphasises the significant growth prospects 
in Asian countries (especially China and Japan), in particular regarding retail margins (up to 66,8% of 
gross margin in 2014) and share in total sales. 
As this work was being written, relevant worldwide developments were underway which 
could bear significant impact on the luxury industry, such as the earthquake and subsequent tsunami 
that occurred in Japan. According to Reuters news agency, the stock of luxury goods companies has 
been severely hit by the tragedy, as fear of negative long-term effects on sales are haunting the sector. 
Company financial reports show that Japan accounts for approximately 9% and 19% of LVMH and 
Hermes’ 2010 revenues, respectively, as a result contributing significantly to the overall performance 
of both companies. 
Although 2010 was a good year for the luxury goods market, the future is more uncertain than 
ever given the impacts of unforeseen circumstances like the catastrophe in Japan and the feeble global 
economic recovery. The general consensus among industry insiders, however, rests on the belief that 
emerging markets are key to the continuous advance of the luxury lifestyle. 
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3.2. Company profile - LVMH 
“The mission of the LVMH group is to represent the most refined qualities of Western "Art de 
Vivre" around the world.” 
Bernard Arnault - Chairman & CEO 
Headquartered in Paris, France, according to the EIU (2009) LVMH is the world’s largest 
luxury goods conglomerate acting in the retail sector. Its product portfolio includes over 60 brands, 
split into 5 categories: Wines & Spirits, Fashion & Leather Goods, Perfumes & Cosmetics, Watches & 
Jewellery and Selective retailing (please refer to Appendix 1 for a list of the main brands). The 
company presents itself as a very creative and high quality goods provider, counting on an established 
and notorious brand, one of its main differentiating assets. With its central focus on retail sales, by 
June 2010 the company had 2.468 directly controlled stores (up from 2.370 and 2.150 in June 2009 
and 2008 respectively), and above 70.000 employees worldwide.  
3.2.1. Product offerings 
a. Wines & Spirits 
The Wines & Spirits sector can be further divided in two branches: Champagne and Wines 
and the Cognac and Spirits branches. Included in the first division the Champagne wine denomination 
benefits from a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) status, which is internationally accepted and 
grants this name only to wines produced with grapes from the French Champagne region. In this 
sense, champagne sales accounted for 83% of the 2009 revenues in this branch. LVMH is known for 
developing renowned high quality champagnes which, according to 2009 data, were produced in 1.675 
hectares of self owned vineyards located in the Champagne region of France, providing a little more 
than one-fourth of the company’s annual needs, while the remaining stocks (mainly grapes and wines) 
are purchased from wine growers and cooperatives according to multi-year agreements. Due to the 
volatile nature of grape harvests each year, the company keeps significant bottle reserves in stock (as 
much as 4,6 years of sales by December 2009) and thus protects itself from lower harvest years, which 
can significantly impact sales for the following periods. Besides champagne production the company 
also develops and distributes quality still and sparkling wines from famous wine regions such as 
France, Spain, California, Argentina, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. Regarding the Cognac and 
Spirits sub-segment, its contribution to the Wines and Spirits activity accounted for 50% of revenues 
in 2009. In this branch, LVMH offers a range of products from vodka to cognac and rum to baijiu 
(Chinese white liquor). As far as cognac is concerned, the company owns 179 hectares of vineyards, 
purchasing from a network of approximately 2.500 independent producers the remaining wines and 
“eaux-de-vie” necessary to meet production volumes. 
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The distribution of Wines & Spirits is primarily made through network of international 
subsidiaries, some of which are joint ventures with the spirits group Diageo. 
 
b. Fashion & Leather Goods 
The luxury Fashion & Leather Goods sector comprehends a group of mainly French brands 
but also includes Spanish, Italian, British and American companies, all of which rely on quality, 
authenticity and originality of design to be successful. One of the most recognized brands in this 
sector, Louis Vuitton, offers travelling bags, trunks, luggage items and accessories with leather as a 
material of choice for many creations. One the other hand, Fendi is another flagship brand focused on 
furs, but also presenting items in leather goods, accessories and ready-to-wear fashion. Other brands 
owned by the Group include Donna Karan, with ready-to wear lines, DKNY, with more casual 
clothing, Loewe, with very high quality leather work and other ready-to-wear items, Marc Jacobs, the 
brand name of Louis Vuitton’s creative director engaged in fashion for men and women, Kenzo, with 
ready-to-wear clothing for men and women, fashion accessories, leather goods and home furnishings 
(its perfumes are covered in the Perfumes & Cosmetics business group), as well as many other brands 
specialized in ready-to-wear fashion, haute couture and footwear (please refer to Appendix 1 for a 
detail of company brands). 
Depending on the brand, the Group uses a mixture of self-owned production facilities 
scattered between several countries and third parties, as a means to supplement production and achieve 
increased flexibility. One very important aspect of this business unit relies on the distribution network 
as it is crucial for the maintenance of distribution margins, close control of brand image and as point 
of contact with costumers. According to company data, overall, the use of subcontractors for Fashion 
& Leather goods made up approximately 32% of the cost of sales in 2009. In terms of raw materials, 
there is a strong dependence on outside suppliers, although the designers and style departments of each 
brand guarantee that production does not generally depend on patents or exclusive expertise owned by 
third parties. 
c. Perfumes & Cosmetics 
Major brands in the Perfumes & Cosmetics sector include Christian Dior, Guerlain, Givenchy, 
Kenzo, Acqua di Parma, Parfums Loewe, Make Up For Ever, Benefit Cosmetics and others, many of 
which combine perfumes, cosmetics, skincare and beauty products in their product offerings while 
others focus more on one a single product line. The fact that the Group possesses a significant number 
of brands allows for relevant synergies in this sector and constitutes a relational advantage, as this 
business unit relies heavily on design and advertising for its success. Furthermore, the use of shared 
services by subsidiary companies makes the support functions more effective and facilitates the 
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growth of more recent brands. Another key factor in Perfume & Cosmetics operations resides on 
research and development, necessary due to the fast product lifecycle, which also has been increasing 
in recent years, with new products being introduced faster in the market. For this matter, the LVMH 
Recherche was established, a consortium bringing together the various research entities of the Group’s 
brands. The production of Perfumes & Cosmetics is predominantly done by in-house facilities for 
most of the French brands, while newer American companies, Loewe perfumes and Acqua di Parma 
subcontract most of their products' manufacture. In this context, in 2009 only around 5% of this 
business unit’s cost of sales can be attributed to manufacture subcontracting. On the other hand, raw 
and subsidiary materials are acquired from external suppliers, whilst the product formulas are 
predominantly developed within the Group, in spite the ability for external purchases if necessary.  
d. Watches & Jewellery 
As the most recent business unit in the Group’s core businesses, the Watches & Jewellery 
sector houses several high quality watches and jewellery brands like TAG Heuer, with its luxury 
sports watches and chronographs, Zenith, an upscale watchmaker, Montres Dior, which offers 
collections inspired by the designs of the fashion house with the same name, Chaumet, the prestigious 
historic jeweller from Paris, Fred, a designer more inclined to contemporary jewellery pieces, De 
Beers Diamond Jewellers, a joint venture formed in July 2001 aimed at the diamond jewellery 
segment, and Hublot, a young high-end watches brand, acquired in 2008. As far as production is 
concerned, the designs for the pieces are predominantly done in-house, though third parties can be 
used on occasion. Additionally, due to very high quality requirements, the components assembled are 
obtained from a limited number of suppliers, primarily Swiss, with the exception of the leather for the 
watch bands. The assembly is almost entirely made in the company’s five Swiss workshops, with total 
subcontracting costs amounting to 4% of the cost of sales in 2009. In this sense, like in other business 
units this branch has also adopted a shared resources structure, thus taking advantage of prototype 
design, sharing the best investment practices, improving productivity and leveraging its position to 
attain better purchasing terms from suppliers.  
In line with the Group’s strategy the Watches & Jewellery is highly internationalized with 
presence in all European and American markets, northern Asia, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region, 
although in spite of constituting an independent business unit in its own right, the branch accounted 
for only 4% of the total LVMH revenue in 2009. 
e. Selective Retailing 
The Selective Retailing segment is composed of specialized boutiques and serves a double 
purpose. Besides constituting another point of sale with a direct connection to the final consumer, it 
also serves to provide a suitable environment to showcase the group’s luxury brands. In this sense, this 
branch is subdivided into two segments, namely travel retail and selective retail. 
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As the name suggests, the travel retail subdivision aims at providing luxury products to 
international travellers. This activity is linked and depends on tourism flows and as such presents a 
high degree of seasonality. DFS is a major player in this segment. It is an American group that 
pioneered the sale of luxury goods to travellers, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, having started 
with airport duty-free concessions. Nowadays, the chain’s strategy relies on voluptuous city centre 
“Galleria” stores, positioned in major airline destinations, which offer three complementary 
commercial spaces including general luxury products (perfumes, fashion and accessories, etc.), luxury 
boutiques (Louis Vuitton, Hermès and others) and a recreational and souvenir area. In spite that most 
of this chains’ revenue comes from the Galleria stores, the maintenance of its approximately twenty 
airport store concessions in the Asian-Pacific, United States and Japanese regions is still deemed 
strategically relevant. Miami Cruiseline is another American brand working under the travel retail 
subgroup. As publicized by LVMH, it constitutes the world leader in the sale of duty-free luxury items 
on board cruise lines, with presence in over 80 ships. LVMH acquired this company in 2000 as an 
addition to the travel retail subgroup, from then on working to expand its geographic presence which 
was primarily Asian and now extends to American and European customers. 
As previously introduced, the other subgroup of the Selective Retail branch bears that same 
designation. In this area there are also two chains of stores: Sephora and Le Bon Marché. The Sephora 
concept has evolved over the years to a perfume and beauty store format focused on direct access and 
customer assistance. Its current reputation enables Sephora stores to sell a number of selective 
perfume and cosmetic brands, while also offering products under its own name. In 2009 Sephora had 
639 stores in Europe, 234 in the United States, 20 in Canada, 76 in Asia and 17 in the Middle-East, 
plus its online website. Le Bon Marché is a landmark department store located in Paris that was 
established in 1852 and bought by LVMH in 1998, with an upscale product offering. 
As a final note, according to company data, in 2009 Selective Retail businesses accounted for 
27% of total LVMH revenues. 
f. Other activities 
LVMH’s activities that do not fall in the categories above presented tap other sectors of the 
economy. These include media communications, through the financial newspaper and website Les 
Echos, owned by the Les Echos group which was acquired by the Company in 2007, the literature 
publisher “Arléa” and the French radio station “Radio Classique”. The Group also owns “La 
Samaritaine” riverside real estate complex, located in central Paris, and the “Royal Van Lent”, a Dutch 
builder of luxury yachts, marketed under the “Feadship” brand, that manufactures vessels according to 
customers specifications, many measuring 50 meters or  more. 
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3.2.2. KPI’s 
The past three years have been unpredictable for LVMH in terms of revenue evolution. In 
particular, 2009 witnessed a loss of sales momentum, much due to the effects of worldwide economic 
crisis. Consequently, from 2008 to that year a 0,8% decrease in sales was reported. On the other hand, 
in 2010 sales grew a staggering 19,2%, effectively reaching €20.320M by 31 December. Income from 
operational activity, as measured by EBITDA, had a similar behaviour and grew at 6,4% CAGR in the 
three year period considered, despite the 6,1% year-on-year decrease between 2008 and 2009. As far 
as EBITDA margins are concerned, an average margin of 23,6% is computed for the three years, 
although in 2010 it has improved to 24,4%. 
Regarding book net debt values, a downward trend can be observed, much due to increasing 
holdings of cash and cash equivalents, but mainly given a contraction of non-current borrowings and 
debt from 2009 (€4.077M) to 2010 (€3.432M). As such, the net debt/EBITDA ratio has declined 
sharply from 111,2% in 2008 to 60,0% in 2010. In the stock market, the Group’s share value evolution 
has been remarkable, considering a price per share of €47,77 by the end of 2008 and the €123,10 per 
share by the end of 2010 (a 37,1% CAGR). This behaviour is believed to be connected with solid 
results attained throughout the year, a delicate, yet positive, economic recovery and a fair amount of 
speculation over a possible merger with Hermès toward the year’s end.  
Table 1 - LVMH Key performance indicators 
LVMH - Key performance indicators
€M 2008 2009 2010 CAGR
Turnover 17.193          17.053          20.320          5,7%
Gross margin 11.181          10.889          13.136          5,5%
Gross margin (%) 65,0% 63,9% 64,6%
EBITDA 
(1)
4.113            3.862            4.954            6,4%
EBITDA margin 23,9% 22,6% 24,4%
Operating prof it 3.485            3.161            4.169            6,2%
Net profit 2.026            1.755            3.032            14,4%
Net debt 
(2)
4.572            3.339            2.974            -13,4%
Net debt /  EBITDA 111,2% 86,5% 60,0%
Total assets 31.483          32.106          37.164          5,7%
Equity 
(3)
12.804          13.796          17.198          10,3%
Closing share price in Dec. 31 (€) 47,77            78,38            123,10          37,1%
Earnings per share (€) 4,28              3,71              6,36              14,1%
Number of employees 
(4)
77.087          77.302          83.542          2,7%
(1) EBITDA was computed by adding amortization expenses to operating profit.
(2) Net debt comprises non-current loans and deposits, cash and cash equivalents and non-current 
and current borrowings and debt.
(3) excluding minority interest.
(4) including part-time workers.  
Source: Company annual reports for 2009 and 2010 and Bloomberg. 
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Figure 4 - Store network at December 31, 2010 
 
Source: LVMH Annual Report for 2010. 
LVMH enjoys direct worldwide presence through its network of retail stores, as illustrated in 
Figure 4. It can be seen that western developed countries have the strongest presence, namely the 
U.S.A., which alone accounts for 22% of the total number of stores, and Europe (including France), 
with a total of 1.010 locations (40% of the total). 
Notwithstanding, Japan also reveals a significant network with 303 stores, while other Asian 
countries, even though with only 20% of the total, are witnessing a significant increase in the 
company’s network in the past years. In this sense, according to Morgan Stanley Research’s estimates, 
this exposure to high-growth emerging markets will drive the company’s supernormal growth in the 
next five years. 




























Source: Annual reports for 2009 and 2010. 
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Looking at Figure 5, the distribution of revenue by region has clearly evolved from the Rest of 
Europe and Japan to the remaining Asian countries whilst France and the United States managed to 
keep their share in total revenues. 
The revenue distribution shown in Figure 6 reflects the importance of regional inclinations to 
a particular sector. As such, Asian countries (excluding Japan) constitute a significant proportion of 
the Fashion & Leather and Wines and Spirits sectors, while Perfumes & Cosmetics are deemed more 
relevant in Europe, as Selective Retail is in the United States.  
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3.3. Company profile - Hermès 
Founded in 1837 Paris by Thierry Hermès, a harness-maker, nowadays Hermès is still a 
closely held family business focused in the luxury goods industry. Since its inception, the company 
has managed to bolster its reputation as a fine leather goods and luggage maker and reach out to new 
markets, effectively turning into a multinational, multi-business group. In the present days the 
company is involved in fourteen different sectors: Leather Goods, Scarves, Ties, Men’s and Women’s 
Ready-to-Wear, Perfumes, Watches, Diaries, Hats, Footwear, Gloves, Enamel, Art of Living, 
Tableware and Jewellery. Much like other luxury players, Hermès relies heavily on its own 
distribution network to sell its products. By the end of 2009, the group had 304 exclusive stores and 21 
other retail outlets around the world, with some products, such as watches, perfumes and tableware 
also being sold through networks of specialised stores, in airport duty-free stores and on board aircraft. 
3.3.1. Product offerings 
a. Leather Goods and Saddlery 
Leather Goods and Saddlery has always been the core segment of Hermès’ operations, a 
statement that holds true even today, accounting for 49% of Sales in 2009. Some of its products 
include handbags, luggage, diaries, small leather goods and equestrian items, craftily produced and 
designed by 2.000 leather workers in some ten workshops in Paris, Pantin and other parts of France. 
b. Ready-To-Wear & Accessories 
As the Group’s second segment, Ready-To-Wear & Accessories represented 19% of 
consolidated revenues in 2009. This area can be subsequently divided into women’s and men’s ready-
to-wear. In the women department, the renowned designer Jean-Paul Gaultier has been the creator of 
collections for Hermès’ since 2004. In its turn, the accessories division offers a diversified selection of 
enamel and leather jewellery, shoes, belts, gloves and hats, all of which complement the Leather and 
Ready-To-Wear product offerings. 
c. Silk and Textiles 
The third sector in Hermès business divisions is called Silk and Textiles, accounting for 12% 
of 2009 revenue. The types of products present in this area include the world famous carrés (square 
scarves), ties as well as other scarf models produced in cashmere and silk. 
d. Other areas 
Although in a more residual proportion, Hermès also does business in other sectors that allow 
it to have a broader presence in the luxury consumer goods market. Areas such as Jewellery, with a 
particular emphasis in silver pieces, and the Art of Living segment, aiming at the luxury household, 
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with products for every room in the house from textile lines, decorative objects, baby gifts and toys, 
are starting to constitute another bastion of the Hermès lifestyle. 
e. Products Distributed Through Specialised Retail Networks 
In addition to the aforementioned segments where the products are sold through the Group’s 
specialized distribution network, there are a number of other products bearing the Hermès brand that 
instead are distributed through specialised retail networks, namely Perfumes, Watches and Tableware. 
In the Perfumes area, the Group is known for its indomitable creativity and ongoing efforts to add 
exciting and beautifully made new products. In its turn, the Watches division is still young, however 
already being reckoned by costumers as an alternative to other famous names in the watches industry. 
Much like the Art of Living segment, Tableware again brings Hermès to the household through La 
Table Hermès, Les Cristalleries de Saint-Louis and Puiforcat collections, with products such as 
porcelain services, glasses, crafted crystal for bar and table, and silver pieces, from cutlery to highly 
sophisticated silver tea and coffee services. 
f.  Other Group Brands and Products 
While the Hermès brand sits at the centre of the Group’s reputation and business, there are 
also other brands and products under the Hermès world that nonetheless are fully aligned with the 
Group’s identity. These include brands such as John Lobb Bootmaker, a Paris based high quality 
bootmaker, to products and services offered to third parties which rely on the experience and capacity 
Hermès possesses, such as Textile operations (design, colour and dye works, engraving, printing, 
weaving and fabrication), Tanning (specialized in purchasing, tanning, dyeing and finishing precious 
skins for high-end markets) and Interior Design. This last segment is committed to satisfy custom 
orders and establish partnerships, such as the project Hélicoptère par Hermès in 2009, which saw 
Hermès and Eurocopter (a French based Helicopter manufacturing company) work together to build a 
new vision of luxury helicopter travelling by means of innovations in interior and exterior design. 
Finally, Hermès also promotes the creation of partnerships with other affiliate brands from the luxury 
market, as for example Jean-Paul Gaultier in the haut couture market (in which the Group holds a 
stake of 45%), Les Tissages Perrin with weaving services for several purposes, the watchmaker 
Vaucher Manufacture Fleurier and WHY (Wally Hermès Yachts), which is the name of the 
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3.3.2. KPI’s 
Hermès’ business has seen solid turnover growth in the years comprehended between 2008 
and 2010. In spite of the delicate economic context felt mostly during 2009, revenues achieved a year-
on-year growth rate of 8,5%, reaching a whopping 25,4% in 2010. These results can be thus 
condensed in a 10,8% turnover CAGR for the three year period. An even better performance was seen 
at EBITDA level, as reflected by the 13,6% CAGR. EBITDA margins however slipped from 29,1% in 
2008 to 27,9% in 2009, albeit a recovery to 31,4% in 2010. A particular feature of Hermès balance 
sheet structure resides on its net cash surplus condition. While this balance is positive throughout the 
period considered, in 2010 the surplus has nearly doubled to €824M when compared to €410M and 
€486M in 2008 and 2009 respectively. In this regard, the Group admittedly seeks an immediate and 
positive net cash surplus so that its development strategies can be pursued with total independence. 
Concerning Hermès’ shares performance, 2010 was a positive year for the Group, bearing in mind the 
share price of €156,75 by yearend, in contrast with €93,31 in 2009 (which represented a negative 
evolution from €100 in 2008). 
Table 2 - Hermès key performance indicators 
Hermès - Key performance indicators
€M 2008 2009 2010 CAGR
Turnover 1.765            1.914            2.401            10,8%
Gross margin 1.140            1.213            1.586            11,6%
Gross margin (%) 64,6% 63,3% 66,1%
EBITDA 
(1)
514               534               753               13,6%
EBITDA margin 29,1% 27,9% 31,4%
Operating prof it 449               463               668               14,2%
Net profit 290               289               422               13,3%
Net cash surplus 
(2)
390               465               800               
Total assets 2.326            2.441            2.919            7,9%
Equity 
(3)
1.588            1.790            2.151            10,6%
Closing share price in Dec. 31 (€) 100,00          93,31            156,75          16,2%
Earnings per share (€) 2,76              2,75              4,01              13,3%
Number of employees 7.894            8.057            8.366            2,0%
(1) EBITDA was computed by adding amortization expenses to operating profit.
(2) Net cash surplus comprises cash and cash equivalents and non-current and current borrowings and debt.
(3) excluding minority interest.
 
Source: Company annual reports for 2009 and 2010. 
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Focusing on the origin of revenues, much like LVMH, Asian countries other than Japan are 
rapidly gaining relevance, representing 18% in total revenue for 2008 while rocketing to 26% by 2010. 
Much of this behaviour is attributed to the vibrant economic growth in emerging Asian countries and 
strong investment in that region, with six new branches opened throughout the year. Continuing on a 
positive note, North and South America also managed to grow slightly in the Group’s total revenue, 
with 16% coming from this region in 2010 (1 p.p. increase from 2008). In contrast, home markets such 
as France and the rest of Europe have declined 1 p.p. and 3 p.p., from 2008 to 2010, respectively.  
Whilst absolute revenue carried on a constructive trend in this last year, the evolution was not 
enough to hold back other emerging regions from claiming a bigger slice of the pie.  
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Figure 9 illustrates which sectors where the most significant in the Group’s performance 
during the three year period from 2008 to 2010. Without doubt, the Leather Goods and Saddlery 
segment emerges as a clear winner in this case, with a strong performance leading it to account for 
50% of total revenues in 2010, comparing to 43% in 2008. Regarding the remaining areas, the Ready 
to Wear, Silk and Textiles and Watches segments have managed to keep stable, whereas Perfumes, 
Other sectors, Tableware and Other products have all declined in relative terms to overall turnover in 
the period. 
3.4. Share price evolution 
LVMH and Hermès are both quoted in the Euronext Paris stock exchange (Bloomberg tickers 
MC:FP and RMS:FP, respectively). Furthermore, LVMH is also present in the CAC 40, a French 
index that aggregates 40 of the most prominent companies listed in that country. The evolution of the 
two companies’ closing share prices against the CAC 40 for the period between the 1
st
 of January of 
2008 and the 31
st
 of December 2010 can be seen in Figure 10. 
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One of the first striking aspects observed in the chart is the overall downward tendency of the 
CAC 40 index. On the contrary, the Groups performed well in this context, presenting a general 
upward slope. Between the two, Hermès attained the best performance, with 81% increase in price in 
the three years (22% CAGR), while LVMH achieved 49% (14% CAGR). 
During 2008, the CAC 40 suffered a relevant decline as a consequence of the global financial 
crisis, reaching its lowest in March 2009 and timidly recovering from then onwards. During this 
period, LVMH and Hermès were also affected by the events that resonated throughout the developed 
economies, as a result also registering significant depressions in November 2008 and March 2009, 
respectively. Notwithstanding, from that point on, the stock performance of both Groups started to 
recover, with a particularly sustained ascent witnessed in the case of LVMH. By midyear 2010, the 
luxury sector was emerging as a strong contender for a fast recovery and future growth, especially in 
emerging markets. Accordingly, at that time, companies such as LVMH and Hermès were well 
positioned for strong performances in these regions, counting with a significant exposure and further 
potential to increase their presence. This is related to the fact that in these countries the luxury 
customer base recovered quickly from the crisis and has been increasing ever since. Around October 
2010, the announcement that LVMH had accumulated up to 17,1% of Hermès’ share capital through 
derivatives and direct stock acquisitions sparked rumours of a potential merger. This event is crucial in 
explaining the sudden peak observed in Hermès’ stock price at the end of the year, as well as, to some 
extent, the more prominent slope seen in the case of LVMH. 
In conclusion, LVMH and Hermès closing stock price at 31
st
 December 2010 amounted to 
€123,10 and €156,75. Overall, both Groups’ stock clearly managed to outperform the CAC by a 
considerable difference, noting that the index experienced a negative 12% CAGR for the three years. 
Consolidation in the Luxury Sector: Study of a merger between LVMH and Hermès 
Duarte Teixeira de Melo e Lacerda de Queiroz    Page 35 
4. Forecasts and valuation 
 
4.1. Inflation 
In order to determine the inflation rate to be used, according to Damodaran (2009), once a 
currency choice has been made, all estimates have to be consistent with that choice (including cash-
flows forecasts). Thus, since the financial information for both firms are in Euros, it is reasonable to 
assume a measure of inflation directly related to that currency. For that purpose, inflation forecast data 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit was used up to 2015. From then onwards, 2% inflation for each 
year was assumed, closely corresponding to the value observed for 2015, as well as constituting the 
European Central Bank’s target inflation rate. 
4.2. LVMH 
4.2.1. Revenue Growth 
a. Wines & Spirits:  
The Wines & Spirits segment accounted for 16% of revenues in 2010, which amounted to 
€3.261M (following a 12% drop from 2008 to 2009 and subsequent recovery of 19% in 2010). In 
2010, the main markets for this business unit were the USA with 26% of revenue, followed by Europe 
(exc. France) and Asia (exc. Japan) with 24% and 23% respectively. In spite of the modest growth 
observed in the past three years (CAGR of 1,4%), this segment’s exposure in these key regions will be 
enough to sustain a 9% CAGR expansion in sales until 2013, which will slowly stabilize to 3% in 
2020. It is expected that emerging markets, including China, will play an increasingly important role 
in this segment, as consumers get more familiar with western lifestyle and drinks and the customer 
base expands4. According to LVMH’s Annual Report for 2010, the growth strategy followed by this 
business unit will reside on a strong ability to innovate and substantial media and marketing efforts. 
b. Fashion and Leather Goods:  
Representing the biggest share of total revenue in the past three years (35% in 2008 and 37% 
in 2009 and 2010), the Fashion and Leather Goods segment is bound to remain strong and a key driver 
of global revenues. From 2008 to 2010, Asian countries (exc. Japan) have gained a 5 p.p. increase in 
this segment’s relative weight, up to 30% making up the largest market for Fashion & Leather goods, 
followed by Europe with 21% and the USA with 18%. This trend is expected to continue and Asian 
sales should make up more of the segments share in the future. Retail sales have also increased in 
                                                     
4 In this respect, LVMH already has plans to plant its first vineyard in China, a project to be carried with a local state-owned company, and 
thus produce the first made in China high-end sparkling wine, to be sold locally under the Moët & Chandon label. (O'Connor, 2011) 
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relative terms to wholesale and licences and will continue to do so, in particular driven by economic 
recovery in the west and growth in emerging markets, accompanied by investment in new stores, 
production capacity and marketing efforts. A Morgan Stanley research suggests a CAGR of 10% until 
2013, but Goldman Sachs estimates show that significant increases in urban population and 
addressable markets in China are expected, suggesting a global 16% revenue CAGR through to 2014. 
Nonetheless, current uncertainty on China’s ability to sustain growth rates, supported on a low 
currency value, demands a more cautious approach. In this sense, a 14% overall CAGR until 2013 will 
be used, down to 5% in 2020. 
c. Selective Retailing: 
Selective Retailing operations rely heavily on high-end tourism routes. In this sense, the 
upcoming of new wealthy customers from emerging market has led to an increase in tourism, 
particularly in East Asian regions, such as Macao, Hawaii, Singapore and Okinawa, but also in the 
west, with more and more wealthy tourists coming in from Asian countries. Asian tourism flows, 
especially Chinese, will also play their part in the European market performance (Bain & Company, 
2011). Moreover, brands comprised in this segment are investing heavily, with new Sephora stores 
being opened and the modernization of existing facilities as well as new and larger cruise ships that 
will benefit Miami Cruise Lines. DFS is also renovating several gallerias and has plans to open new 
stores in the South Asian region. The Selective Retailing unit is more prominent in the United States, 
with 37% of revenues in 2010, but Asian countries (exc. Japan) have become more important in the 
segment’s performance, accounting for 24% of the segment’s revenue in 2010 (an increase of 5 p.p. 
from 2008 to 2010). Also worth noting the Asian countries explosive growth of 42% from 2009 to 
2010, a significant difference from the average 12% growth witnessed in other regions. Overall, this 
segment is expected to grow 10% in 2011, 9% in 2012, and 8% in the two following years, continuing 
to gradually decrease from then onward, with growth starting to stabilize by 2018. 
d. Perfumes and Cosmetics:  
Although the Perfumes and Cosmetics segment only represents 15% of total revenue in 2010, 
a 1 p.p. decrease from 2009, it registered a 12% growth in the same period. In this context the business 
unit was able to regain momentum and hold its position against other competitors in 2010, which put 
considerable investment in media and promotional activity. Notwithstanding, the short-term future 
will be characterized by strong competition and a very dynamic environment, with new fragrances and 
cosmetic formulas constantly being introduced in the market. In 2010, 39% of revenue from this 
segment came from Europe, the region that most likely will be dominant in the short future, but the 
emergence of Asia (exc. Japan), with an increase in 4 p.p. in revenue share from 2008 up to 18% in 
2010, will probably keep realizing a larger cut of revenues, in particular with the growth of conscious 
and wealthy consumers and hefty investments in infra-structures, store networks and communication 
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in those regions. All considering, this segment will progress at relatively modest rates of 6% until 
2015, mostly due to a relatively fragile market position of LVMH brands while facing strong 
competition from big high-end players such as L’Oreal, and Estée Lauder. 
e. Watches and Jewellery and Other:  
The remaining business units include the Watches and Jewellery and Other segments, which 
account for an average of 6,5% of total revenues in the past three years. The Watches and Jewellery 
unit grew a respectful 29% from 2009 to 2010, with 25% of revenue coming from Europe and Asia 
(exc. Japan) in second place with 21% (a 5 p.p. leap in relative weight in revenues from 2008). In this 
sense this unit expects to make serious investments in Chinese Asia and consolidate its position on the 
principal continents. Significant development is expected from some young watch brands such as 
Hublot, while the De Beers diamond brand also has strong potential for growth. In light of abnormal 
conditions that made the extraordinary growth in 2010 possible, the Watches and Jewellery and Other 
segments are assumed to witness a 7% CAGR until 2015. 
 
4.2.2. Operating Margin 
a. Wines & Spirits:  
Operating margin for the Wines & Spirits unit posted a 1 p.p. from 2009 to 2010. According 
to LVMH’s Annual Report, this result was mainly due to a volume effect from sales. Concurrently, 
advertising and promotional expenses also increased, deriving from a greater focus on strategic 
markets, but were offset by tighter control of costs and a positive impact of exchange rate fluctuations. 
While some effects cannot be expected to endure in the future, such as the influence of exchange rates, 
operating margin is expected to recover a bit more from the 2009 low, up to 29% in 2011. From 2013 
onward, a further 2 p.p. increase is possible from a consolidating position of several Wines & Spirits 
brands in emerging markets, thereby allowing for additional rationalization of operating expenses. 
b. Fashion and Leather Goods:  
In 2010, the Fashion and Leather Goods segment presents the highest operating margin in the 
last three years, an impressive 2 p.p. increase from 2009. Once again exchange rate impacts 
contributed to the better margin attained. Nonetheless, the Louis Vuitton brand enjoys a very strong 
position particularly in emerging markets, being considered Best Overall Luxury Brand in China by 
the “Hurun Report 2010 Best of the Best Survey”, a status assumed to be maintained in the future. 
Based on Morgan Stanley estimates, considering this brand alone represents about half of the 
segment’s operating profit and projects very high margins (in the order of 40% or more), overall sales 
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volume growth will support a 34% operating margin, which is believed to reach 35% for 2014 and 
after. 
c. Selective Retailing:  
In the past year, the Selective Retailing segment benefited from continued growth in Asian 
tourism and the positive impact of exchange rates, thus permitting a 1,5 p.p. increase in operating 
margin to 10%. This business unit is very dependent on luxury tourist consumers and strong 
investments being made in Asian tourism hubs will likely pay off from rising flows of wealthy Asian 
tourists. One other dimension of this segment is Sephora, which is investing heavily to remain a leader 
in developed countries and has ambitious growth prospects in emerging markets. Minding the effects 
of exchange rates in past years, operating margins in this segment will be of 10% in 2011, reaching the 
long term value of 11% in 2013. 
d. Perfumes and Cosmetics:  
In spite of a strong momentum originating from several brands within this business unit, such 
as Parfums Christian Dior, Guerlain, and Parfums Givenchy, a strong competitive environment will 
probably force operating margins to gravitate around the 12% level. This is a conservative approach 
when considering possible scale effects from larger distribution networks expected in the future, but 
some segment brands still have to consolidate their position and acquire more volume, especially in 
emerging markets. 
e. Watches and Jewellery and Other:  
With the acquisition of Hublot in 2008, the Watches and Jewellery unit added a premium 
brand to its portfolio, thus increasing exposure to higher price and higher margin products. Much of 
this effect helped the segment to bounce back to 13% operating margin in 2010. The Group’s future 
strategy in this area is strongly focused on the two main luxury brands, Hublot and Tag Heuer, with 
intense investment in production, network expansion and marketing efforts. This posture will 
hopefully have a positive impact on operating margin, which is expected to rise to 15% in 2013, a 
performance also contingent to a successful expansion into emerging markets. The remaining areas of 
the Group’s activity, comprised in Other, reported a negative margin of 35% in 2010, which will be 
used as reference for future years. 
4.2.3. Capex and depreciation/amortization expenses 
Historically, net book values for Property, plant and equipment have weighted an average of 
34,8% of total revenues. While revenues are expected to continue growing at solid rates in the future, 
they are highly dependent on an appropriate fixed asset infra-structure. In spite of some economies of 
scale due to size, it is assumed they are too theoretical to quantify, and thus the ratio of fixed assets to 
revenue has been kept constant in the forecast period. Concurrently, average Depreciation and 
Consolidation in the Luxury Sector: Study of a merger between LVMH and Hermès 
Duarte Teixeira de Melo e Lacerda de Queiroz    Page 39 
amortization expenditures of fixed tangible and intangible assets recorder respectively 10,3% and 
3,2% of total fixed assets in the past and therefore these ratios will be used to assess depreciation and 
amortization costs. 
4.2.4. Debt and Financial Expenses 
In order to estimate the forecasted capital structure for the company, the industry Debt / 
Equity was deduced from a set of industry peer companies. For this purpose, information including 
Debt / Equity ratios was collected from the Thomson ONE Banker database (results presented in Table 
3).  
It is noteworthy that debt / equity ratios in the peer group vary widely, from a minimum of 2% 
in Hermès to 52% in PPR SA. Looking at the mean and median of the sample however, yields a close 
range between 21% and 18%. Hence the target capital structure will be 20% in the long run, starting 
from 30% in 2011, when a lot of investment is due to take place, and gradually reducing in the future. 
Concerning financial expenses for the year, the Group managed a slight decrease of cost of debt in 
2010 comparing to the two previous years (from 5,6% in 2008 and 2009 to 5,1% in 2010) so 5,1% will 
be the applicable rate in the forecast. Given the solid balance sheet the Group is expected to have in 
the future, the interest coverage ratio will always remain above the 28x observed in 2010 and therefore 
no aggravation in debt costs is expected. 
4.2.5. Income Tax Expenses 
Historical Income Tax expenses for LVMH has averaged 30% of EBT in the 2008 to 2010 
period, with a minimum of 27,8% in 2008 and a maximum of 30,7% in 2010. While the French 
statutory tax rate is 34,4%, the Group’s annual report justifies the difference due to differences in rates 
for foreign group companies. For the purpose of this valuation, however, it is assumed that in the long 
term all income will be subject to the French tax rate, where the headquarters of the Group is located. 
Table 3 – Industry debt to equity ratio 




Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA 11,3%
PPR SA 51,5%
Burberry Group PLC 23,6%
Bulgari 27,5%
Tod's Spa 12,3%
Tiffany & Co 31,6%
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. 10,1%
Mean 21,2%
Median 18,0%










Source: Thomson ONE Banker 
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4.2.6. Net Working Capital  
Net Working Capital was calculated including Trade Accounts Receivable, Other Current 
Assets, Inventories, Trade Accounts Payable and Other Current Liabilities. For each item a historical 
trend was established in order to assume a similar behaviour in the future. For Trade Accounts 
Receivable 31 days of receivables outstanding was used, while for Inventories an average historical 
Cost of Sales margin was estimated at 35,5% and then used to determine the total value of Cost of 
Sales for each year. The average days of inventories outstanding in the past three years was calculated 
at 330, which served as a basis for projecting future Inventory holdings. In the case of Trade Accounts 
Payable, the amount of days outstanding was derived using historical Operating Costs, yielding 55 
days of Trade Accounts Payable which were used for the entire forecast period. 
4.2.7. Cash and equivalents and dividend payout 
LVMH’s past dividend policy relied on steady distribution of dividends. In the past three 
years, the Group paid fixed dividends per share amounting to €1,60, €1,65 and €2,10 in 2008, 2009 
and 2010 respectively. Dividend payments are also forecasted in the future. Nonetheless, fast growth 
rates will require a lot of investment, and because cash levels will be maintained around 10% of 
revenues (corresponding to the last three years’ historical average) this is expected to impact dividend 
distribution. In other words, dividend payout will be driven by end-of-year cash reserves, and will be 
of 15% in 2011, progressively increasing to 70% in 2016 and eventually 80% in 2020. 
4.3. Hermès 
4.3.1. Revenue Growth 
a. Leather Goods and Saddlery:  
With astonishing 16,5% CAGR in the 2008-2010 period, the Leather Goods and Saddlery 
segment was the top performer of Hermès’ segments in both 2009 and 2010, while also accounting for 
the largest portion of total revenues (50% in 2010). Solid sales environment in China, Macao and 
Hong Kong was responsible for an important share of this performance, with several new stores 
opened in these locations in 2010 (4 in China). Research estimates from the French bank Natixis 
suggest a 12% and 9% sales growth for the years 2011 and 2012. These are seemingly reasonable 
forecasts, although somewhat conservative given past performance and untapped opportunities in 
emerging markets. In this respect, Hermès’ exposure to Asian counties (exc. Japan) accounts only for 
26% of sales in 2010, contrasting with 30% for LVMH, indicative of underpenetration in those 
markets. In these conditions, around 12% growth is estimated until 2015, when momentum will start 
to cool off and growth to slide to 3% in 2020. 
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b. Ready-to-Wear & Accessories:  
The second most important source of revenues for the Group (19% of total turnover in 2010), 
Ready-to-Wear & Accessories reported a healthy 24% growth in 2010, up from 7% in 2009. This 
business unit is believed to be strongly correlated to the Leather Goods and Saddlery segment, and 
thus is expected to have similar, albeit slightly inferior, growth estimates of 12% in 2011 reducing to 
9% until 2015 and slowly decreasing every year, stabilizing at 3% from 2020 onwards. 
c. Silk & Textiles:  
Although representing only 11% worth of revenues in the 2008-2010 period, Silk & Textiles 
revealed solid growth in 2010 of approximately 25%. In spite of representing a less significant unit in 
the Group’s portfolio, this segment is also important in future growth. The aforementioned Natixis 
forecasted estimates foresee around 12% yearly growth in this unit from 2009 to 2013, which was the 
value adopted in this case and is believed to continue until 2015, slowly decreasing afterwards. 
d. Specialised distribution networks:  
Products that carry Hermès’ brands but are sold through distribution networks other than the 
Group’s own boutiques accounted for 12% of revenue in 2010, following a decreasing trend since 
representing 15% in 2008. This segments’ performance from 2008 to 2009 also observed a setback 
with a negative 9% evolution of sales, although recovering to 21% growth in 2010. This segment 
comprises the Perfumes, Watches and Tableware product lines, each with distinct growth potential. 
Watches in particular is expected to report stronger growth than Perfumes and Tableware, 
notwithstanding the fact that all three areas are still in their early development stages. In this sense, 
future growth rates are predicted to achieve 10% in 2011 to 2012, falling to 9% in 2013 and losing 
momentum from 2016 onwards. 
e. Other Hermès Sectors and Other Products:  
With only 7% weight in revenues, Other Hermès Sectors and Other Products were hit badly in 
2009, a consequence of a 21% drop in sales, but managed to regain some ground in 2010, growing 
approximately 16%. Future revenue growth is expected to be positive, in particular if these segments’ 
strategy efficiently leverages Hermès’ reputation and aspires to increase brand recognition (an attitude 
already witnessed in John Lobb Bootmaker during 2010). Consequently, turnover is expected to grow 
at a solid 7% in 2011, starting to decline in 2015. 
4.3.2. Operating Costs 
The Group does not provide segment or regional information on Operating Costs and thus a 
segmented analysis is not possible. However, the nature of Operating Costs allows some confidence in 
forecasting these captions at a firm wide level. 
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a. Cost of sales:  
Cost of Sales includes all sales commission, inventory impairments and losses, as well as the 
portion of depreciation directly allocated to production cost of goods sold. In this context it was 
assumed that the Group will consolidate a decreasing trend of cost of sales, witnessed in past years, in 
the order of 33% of revenue by 2011. From thereon out, no significant changes in the structure of Cost 
of Goods sold will occur. 
b. Selling, Marketing and Administrative Expenses:  
In the past three years, Marketing and Administrative Expenses gravitated around 34%. While 
marketing and sales support is critical to business performance, future performance in emerging 
markets is not believed to require an increase in the ratio that these types of costs represent in total 
revenue. Moreover, in future years, a volume effect will bring some economies of scale carrying 
significant impact on costs of this nature. Therefore, in order to include this effect, forecast values will 
drop 1 p.p. to 33% in 2011, reducing 1 p.p. more starting in 2014. 
c. Other Income and Expense:  
Other Income and Expense comprehends unspecified income and expense, cost of defined-
benefit plans, net change in recurring provisions and other impairment losses. In total, these 
represented a meagre 1% of revenues in 2010 and thus will be kept constant at this rate. 
4.3.3. Capex and depreciation/amortization expenses 
By the end of 2010, Hermès had a worldwide network of 317 exclusive stores and other 21 
retail outlets. This total evolved from 304 stores in 2009, representing a 4% increase. According to the 
Group’s 2010 Annual Report, investments for that year were mainly aimed at developing the 
distribution network and expanding production capacity.  
Much like the case of LVMH, future investments expenditures are critical to support the 
expected revenue growth rates. Historical fixed tangible and intangible assets represented an average 
39% of revenue in the last three years and this ratio will be maintained in the upcoming periods. 
Concerning depreciation and amortizations expenses, future years consider past weight on tangible 
and intangible assets, which gravitated around 9%. 
4.3.4. Debt and Financial Expenses 
Hermès capital structure is characterized by a negative net debt situation. This means that the 
Group’s cash in hand more than covers all outstanding financial debt liabilities. According to the 2010 
annual report, the Group pursues a conservative treasury management, favouring high liquidity to 
adapt quickly to strategic factors. In this context, in 2010 the Group’s book debt to equity ratio 
amounted only to 4,9%. Simultaneously, information available on past debt expenses does not allow 
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for an accurate assessment of the Group’s cost of debt since it is presented netted from the effect of 
hedging instruments, which were responsible for a positive net financial result in the last three years. 
Consequently, in order to estimate future debt expenses, the effect of hedging instruments will be 
ignored and a synthetic rating approach will be used. Since the Group’s cash covers all debt, its rating, 
mostly measured by the interest coverage ratio, will be the highest possible. From information based 
on Standard and Poor’s ratings collected from Professor Damodaran’s database (please refer to 
Appendix 2), Hermès’ rating is AAA, thus implying an interest spread over the risk-free rate of 0,5%. 
Given that a large portion of revenues come from European countries (42% in 2010), the German 
Government’s 10 year bond is used as a proxy to determine the base risk-free rate. According to the 
European Central Bank, by December 2010 this interest rate was of 2,91% and consequently the 
financial debt interest rate for Hermès is around 3,41%. 
Regarding future debt, as mentioned before, because maintaining very low ratios of debt is an 
explicit strategic posture decision of the Group and a distinctive feature of management differentiation 
from the rest of the industry, the level of book debt / equity for 2010 (2%) will be maintained in the 
future. 
4.3.5. Income Tax Expenses 
Past effective tax rates for the Hermès Group have been very close to the French statutory tax 
rate of 34,4%. According to the 2010 Annual Report, the difference in rates is mainly justified by 
differences related to foreign taxes and permanent timing differences and transactions taxed at a 
reduced rate. As a conservative approach, starting in 2011 the tax rate used will be the French 
corporate income tax rate as stated. 
4.3.6. Net Working Capital 
Future Net Working Capital items, such as Trade Accounts and Other Receivables, 
Inventories, Trade Accounts Payable and Other Current Liabilities have been computed in the same as 
in LVMH’s case. Hence, Trade Accounts Receivable were estimated at 27 days of revenue, while 
Trade Accounts Payable resulted in 48 days of operating costs. For Inventories and Work in Progress, 
256 days of Cost of Sales was used. In its turn, Cost of Sales was based on the averages historical 
weight on revenues of 35%. 
4.3.7. Cash and equivalents and dividend payout 
In the years from 2008 to 2010, Hermès has paid an increasing dividend per share, from 
approximately €1 in 2008 to €1,5 in 2010. Accordingly, the payout ratio has been kept around 38% of 
the Group’s share of net profit. At the same time, considering the aforementioned strategic decision to 
hold a considerable amount of cash in hand, past cash balances range from 27,5% to 35,2% of 
revenues in 2008 and 2010, respectively. As a reference to future dividend payout, cash balances will 
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be able to oscillate between 25% and 40% of revenues, allowing for a steady growth of the payout 
ratio. As a result dividend payout will be of 40% in 2011, increasing by 5 p.p. every year until 2019 
when it will stabilize around 80% of net profit 
4.4. Valuation assumptions and output 
With the computation of the projected free cash-flows to the firm finally established, as 
explained in the literature review an appropriate discount rate was estimated to factor in the effect of 
the time value of money. In general terms, concerning the two cash-flow approaches adopted, namely 
the free cash-flow to the firm and the Adjusted Present Value (“APV”), the operating cash-flows were 
discounted according to the WACC and the equity cost of capital respectively, thus yielding the firm 
value. Afterwards, the Net Debt and Minority Interest were subtracted from the firm value in order to 
arrive at the Equity value. 
Starting with the free cash-flow to the firm methodology, in order to compute the unlevered 
cost of equity deemed appropriate for the consequent calculation of the WACC, the Capital-Asset 
Pricing Model  was employed. Initially, a set of levered betas for comparable players doing business in 
the luxury goods industry was collected from the Thomson ONE Banker database (for the samples 
collected please refer to Appendix 3). Because the peer companies’ betas included the effect of 









where the unlevered beta u  is a function of the levered beta l , the marginal corporate tax 
rate t  and the debt to equity ratio of the company 
E
D . The resulting average for all unlevered beta’s 
was then found to be 1,012. Hence, this was the unlevered beta value adopted for all cash-flow 
valuations performed.  
Other common valuation inputs used for both companies were the corporate tax rate, the 
market premium, the risk free rate and the terminal growth rate. In line with what was mentioned in 
the cash-flow assumptions for the projections, since Hermès and LVMH are considered French 
companies for tax purposes, the French statutory tax rate of 34,4% was used. Regarding the market 
premium, in the literature review it was already suggested this is a somewhat controversial topic, in 
spite relative consensus that it should be calculated based on historical data. That said, a market 
premium rate of 5% was considered a sensible estimate for this input, which is fundamental in the 
calculation of the cost of equity through the CAPM. Turning to the selection of a suitable risk free 
rate, following the reasoning advocated by Damodaran (2002) in the literature review, this rate should 
respect the base currency in which the cash-flows are denominated. For this effect, the German 
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Government’s 10 year bond was selected and its yield of 2,91% for December of 2010 was obtained 
from the European Central Bank website. Finally, in order to determine the future cash-flows after the 
explicit period, the Gordon growth model considered a 3% constant growth rate, comprising a steady 
2% increase in inflation assumed from 2020 onwards and an additional 1% real growth. 
As far as the APV method is concerned, the inputs that weighted in its calculation, and were 
common to both companies, included the unlevered cost of equity, the cost of debt, the terminal 
growth rate, the probability of default and an estimate of the bankruptcy costs. Starting with the 
operating cash-flows to the firm, a terminal value for the years after 2020 was reached assuming the 
denominator as the difference between the unlevered cost of equity (8,4%) and the constant growth 
rate (3%). As theory requires, the operating cash-flows calculated where then discounted at the 
unlevered cost of equity. Afterwards, the tax shields were figured out by multiplying the interest 
expenses with the tax rate. Tax deductible interest expenses were also considered in the future, and are 
expected to grow in similar terms to the Group's long term growth rate of 3%. As for the selection of 
an appropriate discount rate for the tax shields, in the literature review it has been argued this is a 
widely debated issue. The approach assumed for the present valuation has taken into account that 
capital structure is fixed in any given year, meaning the amount of debt is rebalanced in each period in 
order to follow changes in the value of equity. According to Brealey and Myers (2003), in this 
situation interest tax shields are dependent on the firm's business risk and consequently, at first sight, 
the cost of equity should be used to discount them. By taking a closer look on how interest is 
computed, however, it is noticeable that in every given year, when the debt level is established, the 
following year's interest tax shield is fixed. This implies using the approach defended by Miles and 
Ezzell (1985), whereby the cost of debt is used to discount the first year of interest tax shields while 
using the cost of equity for the remaining years. In this context, Brealey and Myers (2003) suggest 
discounting all tax shields using the cost of equity and afterwards correcting for the effect of a 










where uk is the unlevered cost of equity and dk  is the cost of debt. The final step in computing the 
APV involves assuming an estimate for the cost of financial distress. Based on the literature review, a 
10% of total firm value has been assumed in case of default, with a probability of default of 0,5% 
arising from both firm’s debt rating. 
With the main valuation frameworks described, the next step deals with each company’s 
specific valuation details and its results. 
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4.4.1. LVMH 
a. Free cash-flow to the firm 
As opposed to Hermès, LVMH makes debt a significant source of capital. When computing 
the individual firm’s cost of equity, the 20% debt to equity ratio derived before was used, resulting in a 
levered beta of 1,23 and a levered cost of equity of 9,08%. Observing LVMH’s past financial 
statements, the cost of net financial debt over net debt always gravitated around 5,5%, dropping to 
5,1% in 2010. For that reason, due to the consistency of the implicit interest rates, the 5,1% cost of 
debt is assumed as reasonable to calculate the WACC, which was found to be 8,12% (respecting the 
same capital structure). It is important to note, however, that LVMH does not achieve the target debt 
to equity ratio of 20% already in 2011, as it was postulated the company’s capital structure changes 
until 2014 to reach that level. In this sense, the correct procedure in order to value the company should 
involve the calculation of a WACC rate for every year the capital structure changes. For the sake of 
simplicity in this valuation, however, the change in capital structure throughout the years is not 
deemed to be significant enough as to severely impact the final results in case only the target WACC 
is used. 
Combining all the pieces, discounting the operating cash-flow of LVMH at the WACC reveals 
an enterprise value of €60,6B, to which the net debt of €2,9B and minority interest of €1B is deducted. 
The resulting equity value is thus €56,6B corresponding to €118,83 per share, with approximately 
476,8M shares outstanding at the end of 2010. Comparing with the market price of €123,10, according 
to this valuation there is a potential downside of 3,5% at that time. 
b. APV 
The adjusted present value results vaguely differ from the results obtained in the free cash-
flow to the firm valuation because of the use of a single WACC rate in that case. When applying the 
APV approach, the main parameters were adopted as described before. As such, the total value of the 
tax shields is €500M, which together with €30M of projected costs with financial distress and €57,4B 
of operating cash-flows discounted at the unlevered cost of equity indicates a price per share of 
€112,69 (€53,7B of equity value). With the market price of €123,10, the downside potential in this 
case is 8,5%. 
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4.4.2. Hermès 
a. Free cash-flow to the firm 
The case of Hermès is more specific because the company has no net debt and is not likely to 
contract debt in the future, at least while it is working with the current management philosophy. In this 
situation, a valuation using the WACC is equivalent to valuating the company’s operating cash-flows 
at the cost of the unlevered equity. Hence, the resulting enterprise value from the free cash-flow to the 
firm approach amounts to €12,5B, which must be adjusted by the net cash balance of €801M and 
deduced by €13M of minority interest to arrive at €13,3B (€126,26 per share, based on about 105M 
shares by the end of 2010). By the end of December 2010, the market valued each Hermès share at 
€157,75, thus resulting in a 19,5% downside potential considering this valuation. 
b. APV 
The purpose of the APV approach is to separate the operational effects that impact a firm’s 
value from the financial considerations. With Hermès, this approach is rendered useless in the sense it 
is reduced to the free cash-flow to the firm methodology because the company has no net debt. 
On a final note about the individual valuations of LVMH and Hermès, the current share 
market prices clearly seem to be overvalued when compared with the results obtained in this work. 
One possible explanation for this fact has to do with a lot of speculation over a possible acquisition of 
Hermès by LVMH in the end of 2010, inflating both Group’s share prices. 
4.5. Valuation of the Merged Entity without synergies 
In theory, the Merged Entity without synergies is a simple combination of both LVMH and 
Hermès. In practical terms, a line by line aggregation of both companies’ financial statements is done 
in order to build the basis for the cash-flow statement of the new entity. In this process, the risk of 
double counting some financial items (such as sales and accounts receivable/payable) is always 
present, in particular if both companies do a lot of business with each other. Given this context, these 
so-called “intra-company transactions” should be eliminated, as they would be generated internally in 
case of a merger and therefore would influence the overall performance of the consolidated entity. An 
applicability problem occurs when, in the real world, information on these types of transactions is not 
available, which is the reality in this case. As a consequence, intra-company transactions are normally 
ignored, and that was the posture adopted in the present analysis. 
As could be expected, the addition of each company’s financial statements produced the 
aggregate operational cash-flows of each individual cash-flow statement. In order to determine the 
WACC, some inputs are common to the individual valuations, namely the unlevered equity beta 
(1,09), the unlevered cost of equity (8,4%), the risk free rate (2,91%), the market premium (5%), the 
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tax rate (34,4%) and the terminal growth rate (3% including inflation). Regarding the cost of debt, a 
method borrowed from Damodaran (2005) was used, involving an average of each firm’s cost of debt 
weighted by the enterprise value amount they represent in the aggregate scenario, turning out to be 
4,8%. The debt to equity structure of 16% also derives directly from each firm’s values, and 
consequently the levered beta was estimated at 1,2, yielding a levered cost of equity of 8,94%. The 
WACC is then 8,13%, giving way to a free cash-flow to the firm valuation of €74B (enterprise value), 
down to €70B of equity value. Again, the APV valuation was slightly below the free cash-flow to the 
firm approach, revealing €70B of enterprise value, meaning a total equity amount of €67B. 
4.6. Valuation of the Merged Entity with synergies 
4.6.1. Operating synergies 
a. Pricing power 
The combination of Hermès and LVMH will create the largest player ever to participate in the 
luxury goods industry. Morgan Stanley (2010) comments on the importance of size in the luxury 
business by stressing that: "Big is becoming more beautiful." and "[...] size will become a dominant 
theme within luxury over the next five years.". In this sense, they support that, more than just 
aggregating both Groups' market shares, a larger Group is expected to boost brand awareness and 
promote tighter pricing policies, effectively exerting more influence on the market. As far as princing 
is concerned, LVMH's experience and close relationship with the customer, facilitated by its self-
owned retail network, made a tighter control of prices possible and enabled brand-wide princing 
decisions to be coherently implemented in the past, resulting in greater pricing power (as an example, 
during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Louis Vuitton did not offer promotions in order to clear stock, 
contrary to many industry players). While Hermès also monitors closely its pricing positioning, it is 
expected that a concerted, Group-wide princing strategy will bring more consistency and allow more 
market power in this sense, translating into a 0,25% increase in margins of Profit from recurring 
operations. 
b. Expansion into emerging markets 
In the Luxury Market Analysis (see section 3.1) the point was already made that emerging 
markets (especially China) were very important to the industry’s development strategies in the 
upcoming years. Regarding strategic focus and store base expansion, Hermès is still trying to catch up 
with the Chinese consumer base and is well positioned to witness strong growth in this market (J. P. 
Morgan Cazenove, 2011). With the advent of a merged Group, joint efforts made in order to tackle 
emerging markets will prove more successful. Consequently, the process of opening new stores will 
happen quicker. Market analysis, searching for local partners, scouting, preparing and acquiring new 
prime venues will be activities performed with much more efficiency. As investments in new stores 
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will happen quicker, projected growth rates will be a little higher, assumed to happen sooner and be 
present for a longer period, while capital expenditures will also increase in order to follow that rythm 
and maintain the same fixed assets to revenue ratio. This will happend not only in China but also in 
other high-potential emerging markets, such as the rest of Asian and latin America. In practical terms, 
increases of 0,2% and 0,3% are anticipated in 2012 and from 2013 to 2017, respectively. 
c. Cost reductions related to store networks 
By 2010, LVMH had 1.188 stores around the world dedicated to Fashion and Leather Goods, 
while Hermès had 317 (193 branches and 124 concessionaires). A very important dimension of luxury 
retail is the ability to be present in prime locations, something both Hermès and LVMH were able to 
do in the past. Even so, syncronized efforts can be made if both Groups work together in this aspect, 
gaining bargaining leverage when renting or acquiring new locations and in renegotiating current 
contracts. As an example, in certain countries where LVMH does business, leases for stores are 
contingent on the payment of minimum amounts in addition to a variable amount (in particular for 
stores with lease payments indexed to revenue). Of course benefits rising from better bargaining 
power and contract renegotiations will only be fruitful in situations where the landlord has contracts in 
effect, or the owner has potential buyers, in relation to both Hermès and some other brand of the 
LVMH Group. Even so, the Group can rent or acquire bigger properties with the idea of adding 
complementary brand stores adjacent to one another (in accordance with this reasoning, top luxury 
boutiques have the tendency of gathering in the same street or within a certain radius of a given 
metropolitan area). Additionaly, LVMH’s DFS gallerias already have Hermès stores in their premises, 
but significant cost reduction with rents and common distribution channels can be attained in this case. 
For the reasons presented, it is projected that the impact on costs emerging from these effects will 
increase margins from recurring operation by 0,25%, starting in the second year after the merger 
(2013). 
Another idea for potential sources of synergy when considering store networks is the possibity 
that some stores might be closed down or adapted to work with different Group brands other than the 
originally intended to function there (for example, an Hermès store that is thought to be unnecessary in 
a particular location due to cannibalistic competition with other Group entities). With the merger, it is 
assumed that LVMH will preserve the Hermès brand and its identity, as well as its store network. 
While it is true that there is competition between Louis Vuitton and Hermès for the same customers, a 
much better strategy would be to keep both brands working as they are now, thus crowding the 
marketplace and functioning as a deterrant to new entrants while profiting from the already established 
brand projection Hermès posesses. Notwithstanding, some adjustments to store locations, and an 
occasional reduction of stores in a certain area is understood to generate some cost reductions, which 
are already contemplated in the 0,25% margin increase abovementioned. 
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d. Production and distribution synergies 
Concerning LVMH brands, Louis Vuitton's own production facilities enable it to respond to 
almost all production needs internally, relying on third parties for flexibility, while Fendi and Loewe 
are more dependent on subcontractors (located in France, Italy and Spain). As such, subcontractors for 
the Fashion and Leather Goods segment represented 43% of the cost of sales in 2010. In relation to 
Hermès, the Group expanded its production capacity for the Leather Goods and Saddlery segment in 
2010. Being the most important segments in both entities, joint procurement and production efforts 
and sharing of know how and techniques will have a positive impact on production costs. Bargaining 
power over suppliers for quality leathers and hides in particular (an important concern in the fashion 
industry) is also anticipated to increase (in order to illustrate this problem, in 2010 the top leathers 
supplier in LVMH represented 38% of the total leather purchase in that year). 
Looking at the Perfumes and Cosmetics businesses, LVMH is clearly more experienced in 
these markets, with Hermès only selling perfumes on a smaller scale (6% of Group revenue in 2010). 
On the contrary, LVMH has five french prodution centers that provide almost all production for french 
brands (Givenchy, Guerlain, Parfums Chrisitan Dior, etc.). Hence, the perfumes division of Hermès, 
while not necessarily surrendering its identity, would be integrated in LVMH’s infrastructure. 
Furthermore, research efforts in perfumes and cosmetics will occur in the LVMH’s centralized 
laboratory in France, where more than 270 researchers (scientists, physicians, chemists, etc.) work. 
In the Watches and Jewellery division, LVMH does most of the production in-house (external 
supplies represented only 5% of cost of sales in 2010). In similar terms, model designs are mostly 
done in self-owned studios. According to Morgan Stanley (2010): “LVMH lacks scale in this division 
and is investing in watch manufacturing and the expansion of brands, particularly Hublot (acquired in 
2008) and Tag Heuer." Therefore a merger with Hermès will improve the margins in this segment due 
to economies of scale, while Hermès' watches division will also benefit from interaction with LVMH's 
brands and expertise. 
Adding the expected production and distribution synergies stated above, the merged entity will 
achieve a further 0,5% increase in margin from recurring operations.  
e. Marketing, administrative and labour expenses 
Of the most anticipated synergies that derive from the merger of LVMH and Hermès, general 
costs with marketing and administrative expenses are on top. This has already been suggested by Mr. 
Arnault, who said in February 2011 that: “[...] LVMH could develop synergies with Hermès in areas 
including store development and advertising.” (even though the idea was rejected by Mr. Thomas at 
the time). In this context, joint marketing efforts are believed to help reduce costs with these 
fundamental dimensions of the luxury business. In 2010 alone LVMH reported 35% of revenues as 
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costs with marketing and selling expenses, with advertising and promotion accounting for 11% of this 
value. In this sense, Advertising and promotion expenses mainly consist of media campaigns and 
point-of-sale advertising and also include personnel costs dedicated to this function. Concurrently, the 
centralization and pooling of common management services (such as administration, human resources, 
IT, etc.) will definitely allow cost reductions related to General and Administrative expenses, thus 
improving operating margins. As for labour costs, further rationalization is expected to emerge from 
merging common company functions, the limited restructuting of store networks and increased 
efficiency in production and distribution, as mentioned before. In reality, the impact these synergies 
will have on the margin from recurring operations is relevant and estimated to be 0,3%, starting at 
0,15% in 2012. 
f. Working capital requirements 
Table 4 shows the historical cash conversion cycle for both LVMH and Hermès. The first 
characteristic that stands out when looking at the table is the decreasing cash conversion cycles for 
both Groups over the years.  
While no information on these values could be collected so as to explain this performance, it is 
believed this was the result of continuous improvement of distribution channels and tighter 
supervision of suppliers and customers, in particular during the slow growth period between 2008 and 
2009. Another distiguishing feature is the fact that Hermès presents lower cash conversion cycles in 
comparison with LVMH, much due to less time inventory items spend in the Group’s possession. 
Again, no information that was available successfuly explained the behaviour of the days inventory 
outstanding, but it is reasonable to assume that the merged entity with synergies will somehow have a 
better cash conversion cycle than the merged entity without synergies. This will be possible mostly 
given a stronger bargaining power towards suppliers and customers alike, as well as with both Groups 
sharing the best practices on third parties’ supervision and inventory control. In the end, the amount of 
days outstanding for receivables, payables and inventores in the merged entity with synergies will be 
of 30, 50 and 290 respectively, with most of the impact of this synergy focused on inventories. 
Table 4 - Cash conversion cycle 








2008 32             54             305           283                          
2009 25             46             253           232                          
2010 24             45             210           189                          
2008 35             62             350           323                          
2009 31             51             334           314                          
2010 28             52             304           280                          
(1) Days receivables outstanding
(2) Days payables outstanding
(3) Days inventories outstanding
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4.6.2. Financial synergies 
Regarding potential financial synergies, it is relevant to assess each Group’s approach to 
financial and capital sources as they were before the merger.  
Being a large group, run by talented profit-driven professionals with significant experience in 
financial and operating management, LVMH makes use of its size to source investment capital from 
banks, bonds, stock and other instruments. These are means to finance business expansion and 
maintenance, such as opening new stores or refurbish existing locations, to develop new products and 
to grant some degree of flexibility in daily operations. On the other hand, Hermès is still family owned 
and management guidelines, while still focused on making a profit, are more conservative in 
maintaining liquidity and minimizing risk. Furthemore, the Group assumes an independent position in 
order to be able to make quick strategic changes as it sees fit. As a consequence, this translates into a 
large net cash surplus held by Hermès, easily compensating for very low debt in the Group’s balance 
sheet. In addition, both companies make use of derivatives to hedge currency fluctuations, as much of 
their business is done in foreign markets. One other common feature found in both Groups is their 
credit rating, estimated to be the top possible level, according to information made avaliable by 
Standard and Poor’s (see Appendix 2). This aspect eliminates the possibility of synergies related to an 
increase in debt capacity. However, assuming LVMH’s strategic posture will influence Hermès after 
the merger, rising debt levels to industry standards will result in a lower cost of capital, and thus an 
higher valuation. As it is, this debt increase would purely serve to harness the tax benefits from 
financial leverage, considering a top notch credit rating would be preserved. 
Regarding other sources of financial synergies put forward in the literature review, tax benefits 
with the restructuring process, deductible tax losses, and the possible diversification effect of mergers 
are not considered. Even the reasoning behind the combination of a company with good investment 
opportunities, but low on cash, with another company with lots of cash, and limited opportunities, 
cannot be applied in this case. Both firms are believed to pursue any opportunities they find appealing 
with almost no financing constrains. 
4.6.3. Costs related to the merger 
According to a 2010 study published by PwC: “Most organisations overlook the cost of 
integration during the deal closure”. Even though the merger of LVMH and Hermès is likely to create 
valuable synergies which will increase the amount the combined firm is worth, a transaction process 
such as the one envisaged and the subsequent restructuring of operational factors (required in order to 
fully achieve the synergies proposed) must also be taken into account.  
Beginning with the transaction itself, transfering the property and control of a large company 
to another player requires the involvement of investment bankers, lawyers, accountants and a whole 
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other assortment of consultants in order to plan for the many aspects of the transaction. Legal and tax 
frameworks, the definition of strategic and financial considerations, operational and market studies, 
etc. are all things that fall into this category. These are somewhat direct costs with the transaction, 
which are materialized through the payment of fees, commissions, taxes and duties, but are also 
indicative of other costs, which include the opportunity costs related to the amount of time the 
transaction takes to complete (and occasional delays), as well as the decreasing focus in normal 
business opperations, often giving way to missed opportunities and lagging business performance. 
On the other hand, the implementation of synergies also does not come without charge. In 
order to attain costs savings related to the integration of store networks, the renegotiation of lease 
contracts and relocation of stores implies disbursing additional fees. In similar terms, reorganising 
production facilities, processes and distribution channels, so as to make them more efficient, also 
requires ad-hoc studies and the services of specialists, which many times are subcontracted. The same 
reasoning applies to synergies expected from joint marketing efforts and restructuring common Group 
divisions, which will most likely involve dismissing former employees and hiring new ones. Another 
important aspect in this comprehends the costs emerging from the harmonization of IT systems and 
information channels, which are crucial for management effectiveness, especially in large 
organizations. 
While aknowledging the existence of costs related to the proposed merger and its synergies, 
their estimation poses a more challenging issue. Given no theoretic literature on the subject of 
integration costs was found to provide a satisfactory approach at estimating them in this case, an 
amount of 20% of total synergy value was considered. In this sense, integration costs are defined as a 
function of the attainable synergies. Moreover, these costs will be spread by the following two years 
after the transaction (until 2013). 
4.6.4. Results on the valuation of the merged entity with synergies 
While the valuation principles used in this case were identical to the merged entity without 
synergies, the computed leveraged cost of equity comprehends a different capital structure, leading 
inevitably to a distinct WACC rate of 8,09%. 
The impact of each synergy on the firm value can be seen in Table 5. Factoring in the 
influence of synergies, the Merged Entity enjoys higher revenue growth rates, wider operating 
margins, better working capital conditions and a lower WACC, emerging from a higher recourse to 
debt versus the Merged Entity without synergies. 
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As presented, the total value of synergies amounts to approximately €9,7B. In this value, the 
synergetic effect with the most impact is related to the rationalization of production and distribution 
activities, with 30% of the total synergy calculated. Several other items also have an important role in 
overall synergy gains such as: the lower marketing, administrative and labour expenses assumed, the 
cost reductions related to store networks, the increased margin in profit from recurring operations and 
more efficiency in the expansion to emerging markets. The last item on the list, called “Synergy 
feedback” captures the circular effect that the interaction of some synergies have with one another. In 
particular, synergies such as the increase in revenue growth rates, resulting from a faster expansion 
into emerging markets, are more evident the higher the increase in profit margin deriving from lower 
marketing, administrative and labour expenses. 
In conclusion, based on all the assumptions aforementioned, according to the free cash-flow to 
the firm approach, the Enterprise Value of the Merged Entity with synergies is €83,5B, implying 
€80,3B of Equity Value. In case the APV methodology is used, the Enterprise Value and Equity Value 
were found to be €78,9B and €75,7B, respectively. 
4.7. Sensitivity analysis to the individual company valuations 
In order to test the robustness of a valuation exercise and as a way to illustrate its limitations, a 
sensitivity analysis has been performed. In essence, this analysis questions some of the most important 
assumptions underlying the valuation, thus creating alternative scenarios according to hypothesised 
inputs. With this in mind, the assumptions subject to a sensitivity analysis were the WACC, the 
terminal growth rate and the revenue growth rate. By varying these inputs, the price per share was then 
recorded according to the FCFF approach. 
Table 5 - Value of synergies 
Synergies
€M
Equity Value of Merged Entity without synergies 70.349
Profit from recurring operations margin 1.565 16%
Expansion into emerging markets 1.374 14%
Cost reductions related to store networks 1.506 15%
Production and distribution synergies 2.965 30%
Marketing, administrative and labour expenses 1.843 18%
Working capital 797 8%
Financial synergies 775 8%
Integration costs -1.947 -20%
Synergy feedback 1.087 11%
Total value of synergies 9.964 100%
Equity Value of Merged Entity with synergies 80.314
% of totalValue
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In the case of LVMH (Figure 11), looking at the impact of a 0,5% variation in the WACC, 
there is a significant change in the price per share. Furthermore, the lower the WACC is, the more 
impact a 0,5% change causes in the share price. In its turn, a similar change of the terminal growth rate 
also represents a considerable change in the share price, although not as pronounced as in the case of 
the WACC. 
 Now observing the impact of an absolute change in the growth rate of revenues, it is evident 
that this assumption has much less significance in the final share price (in the order of some cents). 
Turning to Hermès (Figure 12), the price per share is also very sensitive to variations of the 
WACC. Concerning the terminal growth rate, some impact is also witnessed, notwithstanding having a 
smaller influence in relation to the WACC. 
Figure 11 - LVMH sensitivity analysis 
LVMH - Price per share
WACC
7,11% 7,61% 8,11% 8,61% 9,11%
2,0% 129,13 114,57 102,45 92,22 83,49
2,5% 140,93 123,87 109,91 98,30 88,50
3,0% 155,60 135,18 118,83 105,46 94,33
3,5% 174,31 149,24 129,68 114,01 101,20
















7,11% 7,61% 8,11% 8,61% 9,11%
-1,0% 154,91 134,83 118,74 105,58 94,62
-0,5% 155,36 135,10 118,87 105,59 94,54
0,0% 155,60 135,18 118,83 105,46 94,33
0,5% 155,60 135,06 118,61 105,16 93,97

























Figure 12 - Hermès sensitivity analysis 
Hermès - Price per share
WACC
7,40% 7,90% 8,40% 8,90% 9,40%
2,0% 135,53 123,03 112,54 103,63 95,95
2,5% 145,28 130,79 118,82 108,77 100,22
3,0% 157,28 140,15 126,26 114,78 105,15
3,5% 172,38 151,65 135,24 121,93 110,92
















7,40% 7,90% 8,40% 8,90% 9,40%
-1,0% 149,55 133,45 120,38 109,58 100,51
-0,5% 153,37 136,76 123,29 112,16 102,81
0,0% 157,28 140,15 126,26 114,78 105,15
0,5% 161,26 143,60 129,29 117,46 107,54
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Finally, for the variables considered, it is confirmed that the absolute change in the growth rate 
of sales bears the least impact on the share price. Even so, Hermès’ share price seems to be more 
sensitive to a 0,5% change of revenue growth rate than LVMH. 
Overall, it is clear that the correct estimation of both the WACC and the terminal growth rates 
is very important in finding a final share price. On the other hand, that is not so much the case of 
changes in the growth rate of revenues. As demonstrated, the sensitivity analysis gives a clear picture 
of the relevance of each assumption in the final result, thus helping put the current methodologies of 
valuation modelling in perspective. 
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4.8. Relative valuation of LVMH and Hermès 
In line with what was mentioned in the literature review, relative valuation provides a quick 
and insightful perspective of a company’s position in relation to its peers, while shedding some light 
on possible areas of comparative advantage or oportunity. The fact that LVMH and Hermès are both 
large multinationals with several business segments poses a challenge in the process of selecting peer 
companies. With this issue in mind, a set of industry comparables was chosen in an attempt to find 
overlaping business segments between them, in addition to other specific and important 
characteristics, such as brand projection, size, geographical presence, growth prospects, etc. 
The table above summarizes the results obtained from the selected peer companies. 
Concerning the selection of multiples, according to Fernandez (2001), the ratios most analysts use for 
valuing companies in the retail and consumer goods industry are the price to earnings, EV/EBITDA 
and price to sales ratios. As such, these were computed along with the price to book and EV/EBIT 
multiples. Note that in the process of estimating some of the standard industry ratios (shown in the 
small table), a few companies were excluded from the sample. This measure was applied mainly 
because those particular values were considered outliers and thus would significantly distort the 
resulting ratio estimate. According to Damodaran (2002), this practice is common in many services 
that report average data for multiples (while also constituting one more reason for the median to be 
used instead). Another striking feature in the comparables’ table is that Richemont and Swatch both 
have an estimated Entreprise Value (EV) that is inferior to the Market Capitalization. This apparently 
inconsitent result derives mainly from the large amounts of cash and equivalents these companies 
hold, which are more than enough to repay outstanding debt. A further notice must be made relating to 
the point in time the data presented refers to, in particular concerning LVMH and Hermès. By the end 
Table 6 - Peer group information 
Peer Group Multiples Valuation
€M Country Share price (€) Market Cap. EV EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/Book P/Sales P/E
Financial information as of 31 December 2010
LVMH France 123,10                58.703           65.141       11,4x           13,2x         3,5x         2,9x         20,0x       
Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA Switzerland 43,99                  22.543           20.589       13,6x           16,9x         3,2x         3,2x         19,9x       
The Swatch Group AG Switzerland 333,33                18.024           16.619       12,8x           14,8x         3,1x         3,6x         20,0x       
Hermès International France 156,75                16.484           21.754       29,4x           33,1x         10,6x       6,9x         54,1x       
PPR SA France 119,00                15.083           19.610       11,8x           14,9x         1,4x         1,0x         17,8x       
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. United States 82,68                  n.a.                8.269         11,2x           13,8x         3,5x         n.a.          21,8x       
Burberry Group PLC United Kingdom 13,12                  5.775             6.772         16,7x           19,9x         8,3x         3,4x         28,5x       
Tiffany & Co United States 46,42                  5.767             6.966         12,7x           15,9x         4,4x         2,6x         25,2x       
Bulgari Italy 8,09                    2.444             3.833         29,1x           61,6x         3,9x         2,3x         93,5x       
Tod's Spa Italy 73,90                  2.262             2.747         14,0x           16,7x         4,3x         2,9x         24,2x       










Mean 10.271          10.676      13,3x           16,1x         3,4x         2,7x         22,5x       
Median 5.775            7.618        12,8x           15,9x         3,5x         2,9x         21,8x       
Standard deviation 8.163            7.150        1,8x             2,0x           1,0x         0,9x         3,7x         
Minimum 2.262            2.747        11,2x           13,8x         1,4x         1,0x         17,8x       
Maximum 22.543          20.589      29,1x           61,6x         8,3x         3,6x         93,5x       
(1)
 Mean, Median and Standard deviation estimates excluding Bulgari.
(2)
 Mean, Median and Standard deviation estimates excluding Burberry.
(3)
 Mean, Median and Standard deviation estimates excluding Polo Ralph Lauren.
Note: Some data for LVMH and Hermès di ffers slightly from the information presented in the financia l statements used in this thesis. Because Thomson ONE Banker 
uses specific methods for estimating particular financial data, information from that source was kept unchanged in order to preserve comparative value.
Source: Thomson ONE Banker.  
Source: Thomson ONE Banker 
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of 2010, a lot of speculation on a possible takeover of Hermès by LVMH agitated the market, driving 
stock prices up to inflated levels, which in turn is reflected in market multiples for these two 
companies (a situation clearly visible in the case of Hermès). 
Looking at LVMH, its Market Capitalization is the highest of the peer group. Concerning the 
relative position of the Group as measured by the EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT ratios, it is slightly 
below the comparables’ mean and median. This reports to the greater necessity for a portion of 
earnings to be reinvested in order to generate growth. As to the price to book ratio, it is a useful 
benchmark mainly because it is not as volatile as market-based measurements and can be directly 
compared with other firms, if accounting practices are consistent. On the other hand, if accounting 
methodologies are not very similar, this ratio can be the source of significant error. In LVMH, price to 
book value is very much like the peer group’s mean and median values. This suggest that the company 
is correctly valued in relation to its peers, as can be seen in Table 7, with an estimated €121,51 using 
the median, comparing to the real stock price of €123,10. In similar terms, the Group’s price to sales 
ratio of  2,9x places the company on the median measurement, suggesting a €122,39 stock price. This 
ratio, though, must be used with caution, as it implicitly reflects a company’s capital structure in the 
numerator whereas the denominator does not account for this element. Finally, the price to earnings 
(P/E) ratio was also employed in order to comparatively position LVMH within its peer group. The 
P/E ratio is widely accepted in the financial world and gives some indication of a possible under, or 
over, valuation of a company’s share price versus its current and future potential (measured through 
earnings). In LVMH’s case, yet again we see that the company is relatively consistent with industry 
standards (P/E of 20x for the company vs. industry median of 21,8x), although yielding a slightly 
higher market price per share of €134,74 comparing with the current price of €123,10. 
As beforementioned, the case of Hermès is somewhat peculiar given the inflated market 
metrics due to takeover speculation. Its EV/EBITDA (29,4x) and EV/EBIT (33,1x) multiplies are 
Table 7 - LVMH relative valuation results 
LVMH - Price per share
€ EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/Book P/Sales P/E
Mean 148,58        156,44        118,50        115,80        138,66        
Median 142,98        153,69        121,51        122,39        134,74        
Minimum 124,08        132,16        48,47          43,96          109,54        
Maximum 338,84        628,22        289,91        153,98        577,09         
Table 8 - Hermès relative valuation results 
Hermès - Price per share
€ EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/Book P/Sales P/E
Mean 93,04          100,25        50,22          62,04          65,10          
Median 89,76          98,59          51,50          65,57          63,26          
Minimum 78,68          85,64          20,54          23,55          51,43          
Maximum 204,55        384,08        122,87        82,50          270,95         
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considerably above industry levels of around 13x and 16x, respectively. The same effects can be seen 
in the other ratios, with the price to book, price to sales and P/E multiples also higher vis-a-vis 
comparable companies. Using industry values, Hermès’ share price estimates are expectedly much 
lower than the current price of €156,75. The most pessimistic result obtained comes from the price to 
book ratio, with a median of only €51,50 per share (a staggering 68% erosion of the original value). A 
less shocking estimate of €98,59 was achieved with the EV/EBIT ratio, whereby the company 
demonstrates its operating margin efficiency.  
Financial analysts’ consensus estimate the Hermès’ share price to underperform in 2011. As 
an example, JP Morgan forecasts the target price for the company to be arround €134, taking into 
account very attractive operating margins and, above all, strong cash flow generation capacity. 
Another report by Natixis, issued at the end of 2010, recommends a target price of €120. While also 
indicative that the Group’s share will underperform, Natixis proposes this price target (which deviates 
significantly from the peer group’s multiples analysis) is supported by sturdy growth prospects. 
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5. The transaction 
 
With the value of synergies established and considering the assumptions adopted, the 
conclusion can be made that the merged entity with synergy creates value as a whole. All that remains 
now is to define how the transaction of the shareholdings will process. 
First and foremost, the transaction envisaged in this work was inspired by real events that 
developed in the end of 2010 and are still in motion as of mid 2011. LVMH being considered the 
world’s largest luxury group of companies has an extensive track record of M&A activity and is 
known to owe a significant part of its growth to acquisitions, in parallel to organic expansion. In this 
context, by October 2010 the Group had accumulated a 17,1% interest in Hermès by settling equity 
linked swaps it owned, in a move widely publicized by international press. By yearend, LVMH’s stake 
in Hermès was further increased to 20,21% through open market share purchases. Facing a threat of 
possible takeover by a large multinational competitor, on the 6
th
 of January 2011 the family owned 
Hermès obtained the clearance necessary from the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (French market 
commission) to create a holding company which would gather 50,2% of share capital, without the 
obligation of a takeover bid for the remaining 40,8%. This action prevents each family member from 
acting on their own and also grants the new holding entity a priority right to buy the remaining shares, 
held by the Hermès family group, that are not in the holding company (12,6%). In this way, the 
Hermès family is sending an obvious message to LVMH and the market stating it does not want to be 
part of a big player like LVMH and feels confident that the current shareholder structure is united in 
pursuing the business strategy they see fit. Concerning the present work, the past events exposed 
above are valuable in establishing two positions: (i) if a transaction does happen, it will be LVMH 
acquiring Hermès and merging it with its Group (for the current purpose the acquisition is assumed to 
be for 100% of Hermès’ capital) and, (ii) there is significant animosity between both parties which 
already translated into effective defensive tactics. 
 That said, it is important to study a practical way through which LVMH could ultimately 
control Hermès. Looking closely at the family structure of Hermès, it already was suggested that 
“[the] fact that they took the pain to create this holding company in the first place is an indication that 
the family is less unified than they want us to believe” (Solca, 2011)
5
. Taking into account that there 
are some 72 adult family members with a participation in the Group, some are bound to be more open-
minded in relation to a possible takeover bid. This assumption hints a way LVMH can start cracking 
the Hermès’ hard core, while simultaneously implying a fraction of the transaction must be made with 
cash (serving as an exit for family members who desire to opt-out of the future company). 
                                                     
5 Analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein, quoted by Bloomberg over a phone interview in January 2011. 
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 In order to analyse the bargaining power of LVMH and Hermès, due consideration must be 
given to each player’s motives. Firstly, it is believed that LVMH is very interested in acquiring 
Hermès, as it is a major competitor particularly in the Fashion and Leather Goods segment and boasts 
very solid future prospects. Hermès, in its turn, does not seem to be open to such a dialogue and feels 
the potential synergy is unsatisfactory. While synergies alone would help both Groups, and was put 
forward as a major reason towards a merger, they are seen as either too ethereal or short of making up 
for the fact the company is a personal accomplishment and follows a particular vision which would 
change in case of a merger. Regarding other players which could emerge in this scene and modify the 
bargaining power of a given party, no outside company can easily fit as a potential second bidder for 
Hermès, in particular facing the position LVMH already has. Overall, it seems that Hermès is in 
advantage regarding negotiating power. 
On the subject of synergies, in the literature review the idea was proposed that synergy value 
(that is to say, a significant part of the price premium in the acquisition), must be tied to the 
uniqueness of the strengths each party brings to the table in realizing those synergies. For this reason, 
each synergy has been attributed a percentage of “ownership” which reflects the contribution of each 
party in its materialization. Table 9 reflects this distribution: 
The total value of synergies considered to be sourced from LVMH is then €5,8B (representing 
some 58% of total synergy value). The fact that Hermès is in a better negotiating position, as 
aforementioned, has already been taken into account in this result.  
Breaking down the value of synergies according to the merit of each player was done synergy 
by synergy. Starting with the “profit from recurring operations margin”, it was mainly attributable to 
LVMH because the key factor in this case is size. While Hermès has a respectable brand projection, it 
is LVMH that is the largest player in the industry and, without it, Hermès could never reach the full 
potential of this synergy. The stronger revenue growth coming from the “expansion into emerging 
markets” is mostly due to Hermès because the opportunity resides within it, even if LVMH will 
Table 9 - Detail and distribution of synergies 
Synergies
€M Allocated to LVMH
% value
Equity Value of Merged Entity without synergies 70.349
Profit from recurring operations margin 1.565 70% 1.095
Expansion into emerging markets 1.374 40% 550
Cost reductions related to store networks 1.506 80% 1.205
Production and distribution synergies 2.965 70% 2.075
Marketing, administrative and labour expenses 1.843 50% 921
Working capital 797 40% 319
Financial synergies 775 10% 77
Integration costs -1.947 50% -974
Synergy feedback 1.087 50% 544
Total value of synergies 9.964 58% 5.813
Value
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facilitate the expansion. Regarding “cost reductions related to store networks”, they mostly come from 
LVMH’s global presence and vast store network which grant it a better bargaining position. Because 
most of the productive experience and capacity that integrates the “production and distribution 
synergies” also come from LVMH, it should have the bigger share in this case, while the “marketing, 
administrative and labour expenses” synergy is assumed to surface equally from both parties. As far as 
the “working capital” and the “financial synergies” are concerned, Hermès should be credited with 
most of the value because, in the first case, it is the company which presents the lowest cash 
conversion cycle and thus can pass relevant experience to LVMH in that field and, in the second case, 
the opportunity to raise debt lies in Hermès, in spite the fact that LVMH is very experienced in using 
debt efficiently. Finally, due to their less direct nature, the “integration costs” and “synergy feedback” 
are understood to emerge from both entities in the same proportion. 
 When thinking about the final price, considering all the calculations made, LVMH should 
establish a maximum offer of €17,4B. This value comprehends the synergies attributable to Hermès 
(€4B) in addition to its Equity Value (€13,3B). As can be seen in Table 10, this offer represents a 31% 
premium over the enterprise value of Hermès resulting from the valuation, while it only represents a 
6% premium over the share market price as of 31 December 2010. This modest premium is believed to 
derive from the fact that a speculative mark-up concerning a possible takeover is already 
comprehended in the share price of Hermès. It is also important to clarify that the computed Equity 
Value should serve as a guideline in order to determine a top bracket for the transaction price, above 
which LVMH’s shareholders start to overpay in benefit of the target’s shareholders. In reality, the 
transaction price will be subject to other forces and will be particularly influenced by how the 
negotiations evolve. 




LVMH equity value without synergies 56.666
Price per share (€) 118,83
Hermès equity value without synergies 13.278
Price per share (€) 126,26
LVMH equity value with synergies 62.479
Price per share (€) 131,02
Hermès equity value with synergies 17.429
Price per share (€) 165,74
Offer
Value of synergies 9.964
LVMH's share in synergies 5.813
Hermès' share in synergies 4.151
Cash offer 5.000
Share offer 12.429
No. of shares 94.867.022
Price per share (€) 131,02
Premium offered over valuation results 31,3%
Premium offered over market price @ 31 Dec 2010 5,7%  
Consolidation in the Luxury Sector: Study of a merger between LVMH and Hermès 
Duarte Teixeira de Melo e Lacerda de Queiroz    Page 63 
In relation to the method of payment, all important aspects described before must be weighted. 
A small portion should be paid in cash in order to satisfy the shareholders who want to sell. 
Consequently, the maximum cash offer that LVMH can make is €6,6B, considering it must keep its 
cash balance around 10% of revenues and cannot contract more debt that necessary to preserve at least 
8,5 times the interest coverage ratio, which grants it AAA status.  
Again, it is also important for LVMH to conquer some key people from Hermès to its cause 
and keep them involved in the new entity, as they possess invaluable experience and are necessary to 
fully realize the synergies. This should be done with the issuance of new LVMH shares, which should 
be traded in exchange for old Hermès’ shares. At this point it is relevant to look at LVMH modus 
operandi for paying for transaction. By the 7
th
 of March 2011, LVMH announced through a press 
release that Bulgari would be joining forces with its group. The transaction refers to a 50,4% stake 
held by the Bulgari family, valued at €1,86B, to be paid in stock, and a further tender offer for the 
remaining participation, which would result in Bulgari being de-listed from the Italian Stock 
Exchange. The announced acquisition price per share also considers a 60% premium to Bulgari’s 
average share price in the 20 days before the announcement. Considering this is the most recent, and a 
very significant, transaction for LVMH, the effort in keeping the Bulgari family in the business must 
also be noted (in this sense, Paolo and Nicola Bulgari will remain Chairman and Vice Chairman of 
Bulgari’s Board of Directors, respectively). Therefore, based on this recent experience and the current 
position of Hermès’ shareholders, LVMH will pay mostly in stock.  
An essential side effect that paying in stock will trigger is a change in market stock price. 
Because LVMH stock was found to be overpriced, the Group will benefit from issuing new shares. 
The market, however, will understand this as a sign that the company believes its own stock to be 
above fair price and adjust accordingly. Hence, LVMH can try to ease this effect by stressing that new 
stock was issued not because it was a good source of capital, but because of the strategic importance in 
sharing future benefits with Hermès’ shareholders in order for everybody to gain through synergies. 
In conclusion, the final offer should be limited to €5B cash and €12,4B worth of LVMH 
shares. This corresponds to the issuance of 94.867k shares at the estimated stock price of €131,02 per 
share. The stock price already includes the full effect of LVMH’s portion in total synergies, which is 
the best estimate of the stock price after a merger has been announced. The cash portion offered is a 
reasonable amount in order to satisfy the shareholders that want to sell, while granting some space for 
LVMH to keep above its present debt rating requirements. 
Lastly, while this work has focused on a possible merger between two significant players 
doing business in the luxury goods industry, in reality, however, if the Hermès family members 
maintain their current posture towards a possible merger, the operation is not very likely to happen. 
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Even if it did, the outcome of the synergies contemplated could be seriously compromised by an 
unfriendly acculturation process. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Overall, the luxury goods industry is well positioned to be a top performer in the upcoming 
years. In the market analysis section it was explained that, while economic and financial instability is 
still a concern in old markets, the increase of purchase power that consumers in emerging markets are 
experiencing offers untapped opportunities for expansion. 
 In the perspective of LVMH and Hermès as individual players in the industry, the use of 
forecasted financial statements was useful in determining which factors will impact future 
performance. At the moment, each Group faces the challenge of successfully conducting its expansion 
strategy towards young markets, a factor that will be fundamental in reaching encouraging growth 
rates in the medium term. However, this will also be important in establishing each player’s 
positioning in the eyes of new customers, a status that is believed to bear great implications for 
medium to long-term success. 
 Concerning the financial markets perception of the two Groups analysed, in relation to the 
DCF and APV analysis both entities appear to be overpriced. Reasons for this point of view are 
probably related to optimistic growth assumptions for the near future but also because of some 
speculative beliefs of concentration between the participants. 
 Hypothesising a possible merger between LVMH and Hermès, the difference in size and 
experience between both Groups makes it reasonable to assume that, should a transaction take place, it 
is Hermès that will be the target of the acquisition. In this sense, Hermès will then be subject to 
integration into LVMH’s structure. Furthermore, the microeconomic and financial analysis of such an 
operation indicates that positive synergies could be achieved. These would increase market power 
through superior pricing capabilities, create cost synergies which help make the business more 
efficient, allow for faster and higher growth of revenues, concede more bargaining power towards 
third parties such as suppliers and customers alike, and magnify the benefits of financial leverage on 
the Group’s financial robustness and overall business risk. 
 Finally, the case is made that the transaction envisaged should be paid partly in cash and 
equity. This effort will require an immediate layout of cash from LVMH’s balances while new shares 
will also be issued in order to complete the payment package.  
In conclusion, while this work finds a merger a rational option generally speaking, real events 
have shown that individual interests and business philosophies have prevent it from happening until 
now and will remain an important factor in the future of both Groups. 
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7. Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Main brands 
Contrary to LVMH, Hermès’ activity revolves around a single brand with the same name, 
offering a wide range of products. 




Table 11 - LVMH main brands 
LVMH - Main brands
Wines and Spirits Fashion and Leather Goods Perfumes and Cosmetics Watches and Jewelry Selective Retailing Other Activities
10 Cane Berluti Acqua di Parma Chaumet DFS Les Echos
Ardbeg Céline Benefit Cosmetics De Beers Diamond Jewellers Le Bon Marché Royal Van Lent
Belvedere Donna Karan Fendi Fred Miami Cruiseline Samaritaine
Cape Mentelle Fendi Fresh Hublot. Sephora
Chandon Givenchy Guerlain Montres Dior
Château Cheval Blanc Kenzo La Brosse et Dupont TAG Heuer
Château d’Yquem Loewe Make Up For Ever Zenith
Chopin Louis Vuitton Parfums Christian Dior
Cloudy Bay Marc Jacobs Parfums Givenchy
Dom Pérignon Pucci Parfums Kenzo
Glenmorangie Rossimoda Parfums Loewe








Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin  
Source: Yahoo finance. 
Table 12 - Standard & Poor’s rating and interest spread 
If interest coverage ratio is
> =< to Rating is Spread is
8,50          100.000        AAA 0,50%
6,50          8,50              AA 0,65%
5,50          6,50              A+ 0,85%
4,25          5,50              A 1,00%
3,00          4,25              A- 1,10%
2,50          3,00              BBB 1,60%
2,25          2,50              BB+ 3,00%
2,00          2,25              BB 3,35%
1,75          2,00              B+ 3,75%
1,50          1,75              B 5,00%
1,25          1,50              B- 5,25%
0,80          1,25              CCC 8,00%
0,65          0,80              CC 10,00%
0,20          0,65              C 12,00%
(100.000)   0,20              D 15,00%  
Source: Damodaran’s website. 
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Table 13 - Peer Group Betas 
Country Beta (L) Beta (U)
Financial information as of 31 December 2010
LVMH France 1,06       1,00       
Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA Switzerland 1,42       1,38       
The Swatch Group AG Switzerland 1,41       1,40       
Hermès International France 0,57       0,57       
PPR SA France 1,20       0,95       
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. United States 1,61       n.a.        
Burberry Group PLC United Kingdom 1,33       n.a.        
Tiffany & Co United States 1,70       1,61       
Bulgari Italy 0,66       0,61       
Tod's Spa Italy 0,58       0,56       
Industry estimates (exc. LVMH and Hermès)
Mean 1,087     
Median 1,169     
Standard deviation 0,442     
Minimum 0,562     
Maximum 1,606      
Source: Thomson ONE Banker. 
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Appendix 4  - Historical and forecasted financial statements – LVMH 
LVMH - Income statement
€M FY2008 H FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Revenue 17.193 17.053 20.320 22.466 24.787 27.305 29.953 32.679 35.255 37.561 39.639 41.580 43.265
Operating costs 13.565 13.701 15.999 17.542 19.512 21.169 23.093 25.111 27.011 28.717 30.250 31.690 32.927
Profit from recurring operations 3.628 3.352 4.321 4.923 5.275 6.136 6.860 7.569 8.245 8.845 9.389 9.889 10.337
Profit from recurring operations margin (%) 21,1% 19,7% 21,3% 21,9% 21,3% 22,5% 22,9% 23,2% 23,4% 23,5% 23,7% 23,8% 23,9%
Other operating income and expenses 485                  510                  633                  670                  740                  815                  894                  975                  1.052               1.121               1.183               1.241               1.291               
EBITDA 4.113 3.862 4.954 5.594 6.015 6.951 7.753 8.544 9.296 9.965 10.571 11.130 11.628
EBITDA margin (%) 23,9% 22,6% 24,4% 24,9% 24,3% 25,5% 25,9% 26,1% 26,4% 26,5% 26,7% 26,8% 26,9%
Depreciation and amortization expense 628 701 785 810 893 984 1.079 1.178 1.270 1.354 1.428 1.498 1.559
EBIT 3.485 3.161 4.169 4.784 5.122 5.967 6.674 7.366 8.026 8.612 9.143 9.631 10.069
EBIT margin (%) 20,3% 18,5% 20,5% 21,3% 20,7% 21,9% 22,3% 22,5% 22,8% 22,9% 23,1% 23,2% 23,3%
Net financial income (expense) (257)                (187)                (151)                (151)                (156)                (129)                (91)                  (52)                  (36)                  (55)                  (59)                  (78)                  (90)                  
Other financial income and expenses (17)                  (152)                770                  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earnings before tax (EBT) 3.211 2.822 4.788 4.633 4.966 5.838 6.583 7.314 7.990 8.556 9.084 9.553 9.979
Income taxes 893                  849                  1.469               1.483               1.708               2.008               2.264               2.516               2.749               2.943               3.125               3.286               3.433               
Net profit before minority interests 2.318 1.973 3.319 3.150 3.258 3.830 4.318 4.798 5.242 5.613 5.959 6.267 6.546
Minority interests 292                  218                  287                  272                  282                  331                  373                  415                  453                  485                  515                  542                  566                  
Net profit (Group share) 2.026 1.755 3.032 2.878 2.976 3.498 3.945 4.383 4.788 5.128 5.444 5.725 5.980
Net profit margin (%) 11,8% 10,3% 14,9% 12,8% 12,0% 12,8% 13,2% 13,4% 13,6% 13,7% 13,7% 13,8% 13,8%
Basic Group share of earnings per share (€) 4,28 3,71 6,36 6,04 6,24 7,34 8,27 9,19 10,04 10,75 11,42 12,00 12,54
Number of shares on which the calculation is based 473.554.813    473.597.075    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    476.870.920    
Diluted Group share of earnings per share (€) 4,26 3,70 6,32 6,00 6,20 7,29 8,22 9,14 9,98 10,69 11,35 11,93 12,47
Number of shares on which the calculation is based 475.610.672    474.838.025    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697    479.739.697     
LVMH - Cash-flow statement
€M FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
EBIT 3.161               4.169               4.784               5.122               5.967               6.674               7.366               8.026               8.612               9.143               9.631               10.069             
Income taxes 849                  1.469               1.483               1.708               2.008               2.264               2.516               2.749               2.943               3.125               3.286               3.433               
Depreciation and amortization expense 701                  785                  810                  893                  984                  1.079               1.178               1.270               1.354               1.428               1.498               1.559               
Capex 843                  1.354               2.864               2.742               2.989               3.188               3.349               3.322               3.190               3.083               3.044               2.901               
Financial investments 9                      4.118                -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Changes in working capital (356)                (503)                1.041               456                  536                  553                  571                  542                  488                  439                  410                  357                  
Operating cash flow 2.517               (1.484)             205                  1.109               1.417               1.748               2.107               2.684               3.343               3.924               4.389               4.937               
Other non-current assets (149)                147                   -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Changes in provisions 47                    182                  187                  175                  190                  199                  205                  194                  174                  157                  146                  127                  
Other non-current liabilities (160)                1.095               281                  437                  474                  498                  513                  485                  434                  391                  365                  317                  
Total cash-flow 2.553               (354)                673                  1.720               2.081               2.445               2.826               3.362               3.951               4.472               4.901               5.381               
Shareholder funds (763)                387                  (345)                (751)                (883)                (1.206)             (2.042)             (3.254)             (3.485)             (4.281)             (4.502)             (4.703)             
Minority Interest (218)                (287)                (272)                (282)                (331)                (373)                (415)                (453)                (485)                (515)                (542)                (566)                
Changes in borrowings 200                  (519)                102                  160                  (526)                (231)                434                  410                  367                  331                  309                  268                  
Net financial income (expense) (339)                619                  (151)                (156)                (129)                (91)                  (52)                  (36)                  (55)                  (59)                  (78)                  (90)                  
Cash-flow after changes in sources of capital 1.433               (154)                6                      692                  212                  544                  751                  30                    293                  (52)                  88                    291                  
Opening cash balance 1.013 2.446 2.292 2.298 2.990 3.202 3.746 4.498 4.527 4.821 4.768 4.856
Closing cash balance 2.446 2.292 2.298 2.990 3.202 3.746 4.498 4.527 4.821 4.768 4.856 5.147  
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LVMH - Balance sheet
€M FY2008 H FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Brands and other intangible assets (net) 8.523 8.697 9.104 10.065 11.105 12.234 13.420 14.641 15.795 16.829 17.760 18.629 19.384
Goodwill (net) 4.423 4.270 5.027 5.027 5.027 5.027 5.027 5.027 5.027 5.027 5.027 5.027 5.027
Property, plant and equipment (net) 6.081 6.140 6.733 7.826 8.635 9.512 10.434 11.384 12.282 13.085 13.809 14.485 15.072
Investments in associates 216 213 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223
Non-current available for sale financial assets 375 540 3.891 3.891 3.891 3.891 3.891 3.891 3.891 3.891 3.891 3.891 3.891
Other non-current assets 841 750 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319
Deferred tax 670 521 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 668
Non-current assets 21.129 21.131 25.965 28.020 29.868 31.874 33.982 36.154 38.205 40.042 41.696 43.242 44.584
Inventories and work in progress 5.764 5.644 5.991 7.198 7.941 8.748 9.596 10.470 11.295 12.034 12.700 13.322 13.861
Trade accounts receivable 1.650 1.455 1.565 1.730 1.909 2.103 2.307 2.517 2.715 2.893 3.053 3.202 3.332
Other current assets 1.927 1.430 1.351 1.680 1.811 1.968 2.123 2.283 2.436 2.570 2.693 2.805 2.905
Fair value of financial instruments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash and cash equivalents 1.013 2.446 2.292 2.298 2.990 3.202 3.746 4.498 4.527 4.821 4.768 4.856 5.147
Current assets 10.354 10.975 11.199 12.906 14.651 16.021 17.772 19.768 20.973 22.318 23.214 24.185 25.245
Total assets 31.483 32.106 37.164 40.925 44.519 47.895 51.754 55.922 59.178 62.360 64.910 67.427 69.828
Share Capital and Other Instruments 1.719               1.852               2.566               2.566               2.566               2.566               2.566               2.566               2.566               2.566               2.566               2.566               2.566               
Share capital 147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  147                  
Share premium account 1.737               1.763               1.782               1.782               1.782               1.782               1.782               1.782               1.782               1.782               1.782               1.782               1.782               
Other shares and share settled derivatives (983)                (929)                (607)                (607)                (607)                (607)                (607)                (607)                (607)                (607)                (607)                (607)                (607)                
Revaluation reserves 818                  871                  1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               
Other reserves (retained earnings) 9.430               10.684             11.370             13.970             15.956             17.882             20.000             21.753             22.784             23.983             24.756             25.620             26.560             
Cumulative translation adjustment (371)                (495)                230                   -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Net profit (Group share) 2.026               1.755               3.032               2.878               2.976               3.498               3.945               4.383               4.788               5.128               5.444               5.725               5.980               
Equity, Group share 12.804 13.796 17.198 19.414 21.497 23.946 26.510 28.702 30.138 31.677 32.766 33.910 35.107
Minority interests 989 989 1.006 1.323 1.465 1.631 1.806 1.955 2.053 2.158 2.232 2.310 2.392
Total equity 13.793 14.785 18.204 20.737 22.962 25.578 28.317 30.657 32.192 33.835 34.998 36.221 37.498
Long term borrowings 3.738 4.077 3.432 3.498 3.602 3.260 3.109 3.392 3.660 3.899 4.115 4.316 4.491
Provisions 971 990 1.167 1.288 1.421 1.565 1.717 1.873 2.021 2.153 2.272 2.383 2.480
Deferred tax 3.113 3.117 3.354 3.354 3.354 3.354 3.354 3.354 3.354 3.354 3.354 3.354 3.354
Other non-current liabilities 3.253 3.089 3.947 4.228 4.665 5.139 5.637 6.150 6.635 7.069 7.460 7.825 8.142
Non-current liabilities 11.075 11.273 11.900 12.368 13.042 13.317 13.817 14.770 15.669 16.475 17.201 17.879 18.467
Short term borrowings 1.847 1.708 1.834 1.869 1.925 1.742 1.662 1.813 1.956 2.084 2.199 2.307 2.400
Trade accounts payable 2.292 1.911 2.298 2.644 2.940 3.190 3.480 3.784 4.070 4.327 4.558 4.776 4.962
Income taxes 304 221 446 448 517 607 685 761 831 890 945 994 1.038
Provisions 306 334 339 405 447 492 540 589 635 677 714 749 780
Other current liabilities 1.866 1.874 2.143 2.454 2.687 2.968 3.255 3.548 3.825 4.072 4.294 4.502 4.683
Current liabilities 6.615 6.048 7.060 7.821 8.515 9.000 9.621 10.494 11.317 12.050 12.711 13.327 13.863
Total liabilities 17.690 17.321 18.960 20.188 21.557 22.317 23.438 25.264 26.987 28.525 29.912 31.206 32.330
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Appendix 5 - Historical and forecasted financial statements – Hermès 
Hermès - Income statement
€M FY2008 H FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Revenue 1.765 1.914 2.401 2.670 2.970 3.293 3.651 4.044 4.438 4.805 5.117 5.359 5.519
Operating costs 1.251 1.381 1.648 1.789 1.990 2.206 2.410 2.669 2.929 3.171 3.377 3.537 3.643
Profit from recurring operations 514 534 753 881 980 1.087 1.241 1.375 1.509 1.634 1.740 1.822 1.877
Profit from recurring operations margin (%) 29,1% 27,9% 31,4% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0%
Other operating income and expenses  -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
EBITDA 514 534 753 881 980 1.087 1.241 1.375 1.509 1.634 1.740 1.822 1.877
EBITDA margin (%) 29,1% 27,9% 31,4% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0%
Depreciation and amortization expense 65 71 85 91 101 112 124 138 151 164 174 183 188
EBIT 449 463 668 790 879 974 1.117 1.237 1.358 1.470 1.565 1.639 1.689
EBIT margin (%) 25,5% 24,2% 27,8% 29,6% 29,6% 29,6% 30,6% 30,6% 30,6% 30,6% 30,6% 30,6% 30,6%
Net financial income (expense) 18                    (13)                  (13)                  4                      6                      6                      6                      7                      7                      7                      7                      7                      8                      
Other financial income and expenses (11)                  (7)                    (3)                    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earnings before tax (EBT) 455 444 653 794 885 981 1.123 1.244 1.365 1.477 1.573 1.647 1.696
Income taxes 160                  148                  221                  273                  304                  337                  386                  428                  469                  508                  541                  567                  584                  
Net profit before minority interests 295 296 432 521 580 643 737 816 895 969 1.032 1.080 1.113
Minority interests 5                      7                      10                    12                    13                    15                    17                    19                    21                    22                    24                    25                    26                    
Net profit (Group share) 290 289 422 509 567 628 720 797 874 946 1.008 1.055 1.087
Net profit margin (%) 16,4% 15,1% 17,6% 19,1% 19,1% 19,1% 19,7% 19,7% 19,7% 19,7% 19,7% 19,7% 19,7%
Basic Group share of earnings per share (€) 2,76 2,75 4,01 4,84 5,39 5,98 6,85 7,58 8,32 9,00 9,58 10,04 10,34
Number of shares on which the calculation is based 105.074.019    105.128.870    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    105.162.445    
Diluted Group share of earnings per share (€) 2,76 2,74 4,00 4,83 5,38 5,96 6,83 7,56 8,29 8,98 9,56 10,01 10,31
Number of shares on which the calculation is based 105.174.244    105.211.224    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153    105.428.153     
Hermès - Cash-flow statement
€M FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
EBIT 463                  668                  790                  879                  974                  1.117               1.237               1.358               1.470               1.565               1.639               1.689               
Income taxes 148                  221                  273                  304                  337                  386                  428                  469                  508                  541                  567                  584                  
Depreciation and amortization expense 71                    85                    91                    101                  112                  124                  138                  151                  164                  174                  183                  188                  
Capex 93                    191                  269                  217                  236                  262                  289                  303                  305                  295                  276                  250                  
Financial investments 153                  38                     -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Changes in working capital (38)                  (121)                217                  56                    61                    69                    74                    75                    69                    59                    46                    30                    
Operating cash flow 178                  424                  122                  403                  452                  524                  584                  662                  752                  845                  934                  1.013               
Other non-current assets 2                      35                     -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Changes in provisions 4                      24                    (10)                  4                      4                      5                      5                      5                      5                      4                      3                      2                      
Other non-current liabilities 8                      10                     -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Total cash-flow 188                  423                  112                  407                  456                  528                  589                  667                  756                  849                  937                  1.015               
Shareholder funds (87)                  (62)                  (241)                (253)                (312)                (394)                (476)                (566)                (660)                (754)                (843)                (868)                
Minority Interest (7)                    (10)                  (12)                  (13)                  (15)                  (17)                  (19)                  (21)                  (22)                  (24)                  (25)                  (26)                  
Changes in borrowings (31)                  (21)                  (23)                  2                      2                      3                      3                      3                      3                      2                      2                      1                      
Net financial income (expense) (19)                  (16)                  4                      6                      6                      6                      7                      7                      7                      7                      7                      8                      
Cash-flow after changes in sources of capital 44                    315                  (161)                149                  138                  127                  104                  90                    83                    81                    79                    130                  
Opening cash balance 485                  529                  844                  683                  832                  970                  1.097               1.201               1.291               1.375               1.456               1.535               
Closing cash balance 529                  844                  683                  832                  970                  1.097               1.201               1.291               1.375               1.456               1.535               1.665                
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Hermès - Balance sheet
€M FY2008 H FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Brands and other intangible assets (net) 53                    61                    75                    91                    101                  112                  124                  138                  151                  164                  174                  183                  188                  
Goodwill (net) 36                    35                    37                    37                    37                    37                    37                    37                    37                    37                    37                    37                    37                    
Property, plant and equipment (net) 672                  685                  774                  937                  1.042               1.155               1.281               1.419               1.557               1.686               1.795               1.880               1.936               
Investments in associates 16                    15                    14                    14                    14                    14                    14                    14                    14                    14                    14                    14                    14                    
Non-current available for sale financial assets 60                    214                  250                  250                  250                  250                  250                  250                  250                  250                  250                  250                  250                  
Other non-current assets 21                    23                    26                    26                    26                    26                    26                    26                    26                    26                    26                    26                    26                    
Deferred tax 141                  143                  178                  178                  178                  178                  178                  178                  178                  178                  178                  178                  178                  
Non-current assets 999                  1.176               1.355               1.533               1.648               1.773               1.911               2.062               2.214               2.355               2.475               2.568               2.630               
Inventories and work in progress 522                  486                  469                  661                  735                  815                  904                  1.001               1.099               1.190               1.267               1.327               1.367               
Trade accounts receivable 153                  132                  159                  198                  220                  244                  271                  300                  329                  356                  379                  397                  409                  
Other current assets 71                    59                    71                    71                    71                    71                    71                    71                    71                    71                    71                    71                    71                    
Fair value of financial instruments 95                    58                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    
Cash and cash equivalents 485                  529                  844                  683                  832                  970                  1.097               1.201               1.291               1.375               1.456               1.535               1.665               
Current assets 1.326               1.265               1.564               1.634               1.879               2.121               2.364               2.594               2.811               3.013               3.194               3.351               3.533               
Total assets 2.325               2.441               2.919               3.167               3.528               3.894               4.275               4.656               5.025               5.367               5.669               5.919               6.163               
Share Capital and Other Instruments 51                    81                    65                    65                    65                    65                    65                    65                    65                    65                    65                    65                    65                    
Share capital 54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    54                    
Share premium account 49                    50                    50                    50                    50                    50                    50                    50                    50                    50                    50                    50                    50                    
Other shares and share settled derivatives (52)                  (23)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  (39)                  
Revaluation reserves  -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Other reserves (retained earnings) 1.273               1.452               1.621               1.839               2.093               2.346               2.578               2.820               3.049               3.260               3.451               3.615               3.800               
Cumulative translation adjustment (26)                  (31)                  43                     -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Net profit (Group share) 290                  289                  422                  509                  567                  628                  720                  797                  874                  946                  1.008               1.055               1.087               
Equity, Group share 1.588               1.790               2.151               2.413               2.725               3.039               3.363               3.682               3.988               4.272               4.524               4.735               4.952               
Minority interests 14                    14                    13                    18                    20                    22                    25                    27                    30                    32                    33                    35                    37                    
Total equity 1.602               1.804               2.163               2.431               2.745               3.062               3.388               3.709               4.017               4.303               4.557               4.770               4.989               
Long term borrowings 24                    19                    18                    8                      9                      10                    11                    13                    14                    15                    16                    17                    17                    
Provisions 3                      8                      14                    10                    11                    13                    14                    16                    17                    18                    20                    21                    21                    
Deferred tax 10                    10                    12                    12                    12                    12                    12                    12                    12                    12                    12                    12                    12                    
Other non-current liabilities 71                    79                    86                    86                    86                    86                    86                    86                    86                    86                    86                    86                    86                    
Non-current liabilities 108                  115                  131                  117                  119                  121                  124                  127                  129                  132                  134                  136                  137                  
Short term borrowings 71                    45                    26                    12                    14                    15                    17                    18                    20                    22                    23                    24                    25                    
Trade accounts payable 211                  198                  235                  272                  303                  336                  368                  407                  447                  484                  515                  540                  556                  
Income taxes 45                    39                    76                    83                    92                    102                  117                  129                  142                  154                  164                  171                  177                  
Provisions 15                    14                    31                    25                    28                    31                    35                    39                    42                    46                    49                    51                    53                    
Other current liabilities 274                  224                  257                  227                  227                  227                  227                  227                  227                  227                  227                  227                  227                  
Current liabilities 615                  521                  624                  619                  664                  711                  763                  820                  878                  932                  978                  1.013               1.037               
Total liabilities 723                  637                  755                  736                  783                  832                  887                  947                  1.008               1.064               1.112               1.149               1.174               
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Appendix 6 - Historical and forecasted financial statements – Merged entity without synergies 
Merged Entity - Income statement
€M FY2008 H FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Revenue 18.958 18.967 22.721 25.136 27.757 30.598 33.604 36.723 39.694 42.366 44.756 46.938 48.784
Operating costs 14.816 15.082 17.647 19.331 21.501 23.375 25.503 27.780 29.940 31.888 33.628 35.227 36.570
Profit from recurring operations 4.142 3.886 5.074 5.804 6.255 7.223 8.101 8.943 9.754 10.478 11.128 11.711 12.214
Profit from recurring operations margin (%) 21,8% 20,5% 22,3% 23,1% 22,5% 23,6% 24,1% 24,4% 24,6% 24,7% 24,9% 25,0% 25,0%
Other operating income and expenses 485                  510                  633                  670                  740                  815                  894                  975                  1.052               1.121               1.183               1.241               1.291               
EBITDA 4.627 4.396 5.707 6.475 6.995 8.037 8.995 9.918 10.806 11.599 12.311 12.952 13.505
EBITDA margin (%) 24,4% 23,2% 25,1% 25,8% 25,2% 26,3% 26,8% 27,0% 27,2% 27,4% 27,5% 27,6% 27,7%
Depreciation and amortization expense 693 772 870 901 994 1.096 1.204 1.315 1.422 1.517 1.603 1.681 1.747
EBIT 3.934 3.624 4.837 5.574 6.000 6.941 7.791 8.603 9.384 10.082 10.708 11.271 11.758
EBIT margin (%) 20,8% 19,1% 21,3% 22,2% 21,6% 22,7% 23,2% 23,4% 23,6% 23,8% 23,9% 24,0% 24,1%
Net financial income (expense) (239)                (200)                (164)                (147)                (150)                (123)                (85)                  (45)                  (29)                  (48)                  (52)                  (71)                  (82)                  
Other financial income and expenses (28)                  (159)                767                  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earnings before tax (EBT) 3.666 3.266 5.441 5.427 5.851 6.818 7.706 8.558 9.355 10.033 10.657 11.200 11.676
Income taxes 1.053               997                  1.690               1.756               2.013               2.346               2.651               2.944               3.218               3.451               3.666               3.853               4.016               
Net profit before minority interests 2.613 2.269 3.751 3.671 3.838 4.473 5.055 5.614 6.137 6.582 6.991 7.347 7.659
Minority interests 297                  225                  297                  284                  295                  346                  390                  434                  474                  508                  539                  567                  592                  
Net profit (Group share) 2.316 2.044 3.454 3.387 3.543 4.127 4.665 5.180 5.663 6.074 6.452 6.780 7.067
Net profit margin (%) 12,2% 10,8% 15,2% 13,5% 12,8% 13,5% 13,9% 14,1% 14,3% 14,3% 14,4% 14,4% 14,5%  
Merged Entity - Cash-flow statement
€M FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
EBIT 3.624               4.837               5.574               6.000               6.941               7.791               8.603               9.384               10.082             10.708             11.271             11.758             
Income taxes 997                  1.690               1.756               2.013               2.346               2.651               2.944               3.218               3.451               3.666               3.853               4.016               
Depreciation and amortization expense 772                  870                  901                  994                  1.096               1.204               1.315               1.422               1.517               1.603               1.681               1.747               
Capex 936                  1.545               3.133               2.958               3.226               3.450               3.638               3.625               3.495               3.378               3.319               3.151               
Financial investments 162                  4.156                -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Changes in working capital (394)                (624)                1.259               513                  597                  622                  645                  617                  558                  498                  456                  388                  
Operating cash flow 2.695               (1.060)             327                  1.511               1.869               2.271               2.692               3.345               4.095               4.769               5.324               5.950               
Other non-current assets (147)                182                   -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Changes in provisions 51                    206                  177                  179                  194                  204                  211                  199                  179                  161                  149                  129                  
Other non-current liabilities (152)                1.105               281                  437                  474                  498                  513                  485                  434                  391                  365                  317                  
Total cash-flow 2.741               69                    785                  2.127               2.537               2.974               3.415               4.030               4.708               5.321               5.838               6.396               
Shareholder funds (850)                325                  (586)                (1.004)             (1.195)             (1.600)             (2.518)             (3.820)             (4.145)             (5.035)             (5.345)             (5.571)             
Minority Interest (225)                (297)                (284)                (295)                (346)                (390)                (434)                (474)                (508)                (539)                (567)                (592)                
Changes in borrowings 169                  (540)                78                    162                  (523)                (228)                437                  413                  370                  333                  311                  270                  
Net financial income (expense) (358)                603                  (147)                (150)                (123)                (85)                  (45)                  (29)                  (48)                  (52)                  (71)                  (82)                  
Cash-flow after changes in sources of capital 1.477               161                  (155)                840                  350                  671                  856                  120                  377                  29                    167                  421                  
Opening cash balance 1.498               2.975               3.136               2.981               3.822               4.172               4.843               5.699               5.818               6.195               6.224               6.391               
Closing cash balance 2.975               3.136               2.981               3.822               4.172               4.843               5.699               5.818               6.195               6.224               6.391               6.811                
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Merged Entity - Balance sheet
€M FY2008 H FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Brands and other intangible assets (net) 8.576               8.758               9.179               10.156             11.207             12.346             13.544             14.779             15.947             16.992             17.934             18.812             19.572             
Goodwill (net) 4.459               4.305               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               
Property, plant and equipment (net) 6.753               6.825               7.507               8.763               9.677               10.667             11.715             12.803             13.839             14.771             15.604             16.365             17.008             
Investments in associates 232                  228                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  
Non-current available for sale financial assets 435                  754                  4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               
Other non-current assets 862                  773                  345                  345                  345                  345                  345                  345                  345                  345                  345                  345                  345                  
Deferred tax 811                  664                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  
Non-current assets 22.128             22.307             27.320             29.553             31.517             33.646             35.893             38.215             40.419             42.396             44.171             45.810             47.213             
Inventories and work in progress 6.286               6.130               6.460               7.859               8.677               9.564               10.501             11.471             12.394             13.224             13.967             14.649             15.228             
Trade accounts receivable 1.803               1.587               1.724               1.928               2.129               2.347               2.577               2.816               3.044               3.249               3.432               3.599               3.741               
Other current assets 1.998               1.489               1.422               1.750               1.882               2.038               2.193               2.354               2.506               2.641               2.763               2.876               2.975               
Fair value of financial instruments 95                    58                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    
Cash and cash equivalents 1.498               2.975               3.136               2.981               3.822               4.172               4.843               5.699               5.818               6.195               6.224               6.391               6.811               
Current assets 11.680             12.240             12.763             14.540             16.531             18.143             20.136             22.362             23.785             25.331             26.408             27.536             28.778             
Total assets 33.808             34.547             40.083             44.093             48.047             51.789             56.029             60.578             64.203             67.727             70.579             73.346             75.991             
Share Capital and Other Instruments 1.770               1.933               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               
Share capital 201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  
Share premium account 1.786               1.813               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               
Other shares and share settled derivatives (1.035)             (952)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                
Revaluation reserves 818                  871                  1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               
Other reserves (retained earnings) 10.703             12.136             12.991             15.810             18.049             20.228             22.578             24.573             25.833             27.244             28.207             29.234             30.361             
Cumulative translation adjustment (397)                (526)                273                   -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Net profit (Group share) 2.316               2.044               3.454               3.387               3.543               4.127               4.665               5.180               5.663               6.074               6.452               6.780               7.067               
Equity, Group share 14.392             15.586             19.349             21.827             24.222             26.985             29.874             32.384             34.126             35.949             37.289             38.645             40.059             
Minority interests 1.003               1.003               1.019               1.341               1.485               1.654               1.831               1.983               2.083               2.190               2.266               2.345               2.428               
Total equity 15.395             16.589             20.367             23.168             25.707             28.639             31.705             34.367             36.209             38.138             39.555             40.991             42.487             
Long term borrowings 3.762               4.096               3.450               3.507               3.612               3.270               3.121               3.405               3.674               3.914               4.131               4.333               4.509               
Provisions 974                  998                  1.181               1.298               1.432               1.578               1.731               1.889               2.038               2.171               2.292               2.404               2.501               
Deferred tax 3.123               3.127               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               
Other non-current liabilities 3.324               3.168               4.033               4.314               4.751               5.225               5.723               6.237               6.721               7.155               7.546               7.912               8.229               
Non-current liabilities 11.183             11.388             12.031             12.485             13.161             13.439             13.941             14.896             15.799             16.607             17.335             18.015             18.604             
Short term borrowings 1.918               1.753               1.860               1.882               1.939               1.757               1.678               1.831               1.976               2.105               2.222               2.331               2.425               
Trade accounts payable 2.503               2.109               2.533               2.916               3.243               3.526               3.848               4.191               4.517               4.811               5.074               5.315               5.518               
Income taxes 349                  260                  522                  531                  609                  709                  802                  890                  973                  1.044               1.109               1.165               1.215               
Provisions 321                  348                  370                  430                  475                  524                  575                  628                  678                  723                  763                  800                  832                  
Other current liabilities 2.140               2.098               2.400               2.681               2.913               3.195               3.481               3.774               4.051               4.298               4.521               4.728               4.909               
Current liabilities 7.230               6.569               7.684               8.440               9.179               9.710               10.383             11.315             12.195             12.981             13.689             14.340             14.899             
Total liabilities 18.413             17.958             19.715             20.925             22.340             23.149             24.324             26.211             27.994             29.589             31.024             32.355             33.504             
Total liabilities and equity 33.808             34.547             40.083             44.093             48.047             51.789             56.029             60.578             64.203             67.727             70.579             73.346             75.991              
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Appendix 7 - Historical and forecasted financial statements – Merged entity with synergies 
Merged Entity (w/ synergies) - Income statement
€M FY2008 H FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Revenue 18.958 18.967 22.721 25.136 27.807 30.736 33.849 37.092 40.204 42.991 45.459 47.630 49.503
Operating costs 14.816 15.082 17.647 19.331 21.429 23.143 25.249 27.576 29.802 31.799 33.565 35.127 36.466
Profit from recurring operations 4.142 3.886 5.074 5.804 6.378 7.593 8.600 9.515 10.402 11.192 11.894 12.503 13.038
Profit from recurring operations margin (%) 21,8% 20,5% 22,3% 23,1% 22,9% 24,7% 25,4% 25,7% 25,9% 26,0% 26,2% 26,3% 26,3%
Other operating income and expenses 485                  510                  633                  670                  (234)                (159)                894                  975                  1.052               1.121               1.183               1.241               1.291               
EBITDA 4.627 4.396 5.707 6.475 6.144 7.435 9.494 10.490 11.454 12.312 13.077 13.744 14.328
EBITDA margin (%) 24,4% 23,2% 25,1% 25,8% 22,1% 24,2% 28,0% 28,3% 28,5% 28,6% 28,8% 28,9% 28,9%
Depreciation and amortization expense 693 772 870 901 994 1.096 1.204 1.315 1.422 1.517 1.603 1.681 1.747
EBIT 3.934 3.624 4.837 5.574 5.149 6.338 8.290 9.175 10.032 10.795 11.474 12.063 12.581
EBIT margin (%) 20,8% 19,1% 21,3% 22,2% 18,5% 20,6% 24,5% 24,7% 25,0% 25,1% 25,2% 25,3% 25,4%
Net financial income (expense) (239)                (200)                (164)                (147)                (150)                (123)                (90)                  (48)                  (31)                  (52)                  (56)                  (76)                  (88)                  
Other financial income and expenses (28)                  (159)                767                  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earnings before tax (EBT) 3.666 3.266 5.441 5.427 4.999 6.215 8.200 9.127 10.001 10.743 11.419 11.987 12.493
Income taxes 1.053               997                  1.690               1.756               2.013               2.346               2.651               2.944               3.218               3.451               3.666               3.853               4.016               
Net profit before minority interests 2.613 2.269 3.751 3.671 2.987 3.870 5.549 6.183 6.783 7.292 7.753 8.134 8.477
Minority interests 297                  225                  297                  284                  295                  346                  390                  434                  474                  508                  539                  567                  592                  
Net profit (Group share) 2.316 2.044 3.454 3.387 2.692 3.524 5.159 5.749 6.309 6.784 7.214 7.567 7.885
Net profit margin (%) 12,2% 10,8% 15,2% 13,5% 9,7% 11,5% 15,2% 15,5% 15,7% 15,8% 15,9% 15,9% 15,9%  
Merged Entity (w/ synergies) - Cash-flow statement
€M FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
EBIT 3.624               4.837               5.574               5.149               6.338               8.290               9.175               10.032             10.795             11.474             12.063             12.581             
Income taxes 997                  1.690               1.756               2.013               2.346               2.651               2.944               3.218               3.451               3.666               3.853               4.016               
Depreciation and amortization expense 772                  870                  901                  994                  1.096               1.204               1.315               1.422               1.517               1.603               1.681               1.747               
Capex 936                  1.545               3.133               2.997               3.293               3.531               3.732               3.732               3.581               3.436               3.311               3.171               
Financial investments 162                  4.156                -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Changes in working capital (394)                (624)                1.259               137                  606                  621                  640                  620                  558                  491                  425                  367                  
Operating cash flow 2.695               (1.060)             327                  998                  1.189               2.691               3.174               3.884               4.721               5.483               6.155               6.773               
Other non-current assets (147)                182                   -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Changes in provisions 51                    206                  177                  179                  194                  204                  211                  199                  179                  161                  149                  129                  
Other non-current liabilities (152)                1.105               281                  437                  474                  498                  513                  485                  434                  391                  365                  317                  
Total cash-flow 2.741               69                    785                  1.614               1.857               3.394               3.898               4.568               5.334               6.035               6.670               7.219               
Shareholder funds (850)                325                  (586)                (152)                (591)                (2.093)             (3.087)             (4.466)             (4.855)             (5.797)             (6.131)             (6.389)             
Minority Interest (225)                (297)                (284)                (295)                (346)                (390)                (434)                (474)                (508)                (539)                (567)                (592)                
Changes in borrowings 169                  (540)                78                    172                  (510)                39                    483                  462                  413                  367                  326                  285                  
Net financial income (expense) (358)                603                  (147)                (150)                (123)                (90)                  (48)                  (31)                  (52)                  (56)                  (76)                  (88)                  
Cash-flow after changes in sources of capital 1.477               160                  (155)                1.188               286                  859                  812                  58                    332                  10                    222                  436                  
Opening cash balance 1.498               2.975               3.136               2.981               4.169               4.455               5.314               6.126               6.184               6.517               6.527               6.749               
Closing cash balance 2.975               3.136               2.981               4.169               4.455               5.314               6.126               6.184               6.517               6.527               6.749               7.185                
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Merged Entity (w/ synergies) - Balance sheet
€M FY2008 H FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Brands and other intangible assets (net) 8.576               8.758               9.179               10.156             11.227             12.402             13.643             14.928             16.152             17.243             18.216             19.089             19.860             
Goodwill (net) 4.459               4.305               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               5.064               
Property, plant and equipment (net) 6.753               6.825               7.507               8.763               9.694               10.716             11.801             12.932             14.017             14.988             15.849             16.606             17.259             
Investments in associates 232                  228                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  237                  
Non-current available for sale financial assets 435                  754                  4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               4.141               
Other non-current assets 862                  773                  345                  345                  345                  346                  347                  348                  349                  350                  350                  350                  350                  
Deferred tax 811                  664                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  846                  
Non-current assets 22.128             22.307             27.320             29.553             31.555             33.752             36.079             38.496             40.806             42.870             44.704             46.333             47.758             
Inventories and work in progress 6.286               6.130               6.460               7.859               7.836               8.662               9.539               10.453             11.330             12.116             12.811             13.423             13.951             
Trade accounts receivable 1.803               1.587               1.724               1.928               2.285               2.526               2.782               3.049               3.304               3.533               3.736               3.915               4.069               
Other current assets 1.998               1.489               1.422               1.750               1.882               2.038               2.193               2.354               2.506               2.641               2.763               2.876               2.975               
Fair value of financial instruments 95                    58                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    22                    
Cash and cash equivalents 1.498               2.975               3.136               2.981               4.169               4.455               5.314               6.126               6.184               6.517               6.527               6.749               7.185               
Current assets 11.680             12.240             12.763             14.540             16.194             17.704             19.851             22.003             23.347             24.828             25.859             26.984             28.201             
Total assets 33.808             34.547             40.083             44.093             47.749             51.456             55.930             60.499             64.153             67.698             70.563             73.317             75.959             
Share Capital and Other Instruments 1.770               1.933               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               2.631               
Share capital 201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  201                  
Share premium account 1.786               1.813               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               1.832               
Other shares and share settled derivatives (1.035)             (952)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                (646)                
Revaluation reserves 818                  871                  1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               1.244               
Other reserves (retained earnings) 10.703             12.136             12.991             15.810             18.049             20.228             22.578             24.573             25.833             27.244             28.207             29.234             30.361             
Cumulative translation adjustment (397)                (526)                273                   -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                     
Net profit (Group share) 2.316               2.044               3.454               3.387               3.543               4.127               4.665               5.180               5.663               6.074               6.452               6.780               7.067               
Equity, Group share 14.392             15.586             19.349             21.827             24.222             26.985             29.874             32.384             34.126             35.949             37.289             38.645             40.059             
Minority interests 1.003               1.003               1.019               1.341               1.485               1.654               1.831               1.983               2.083               2.190               2.266               2.345               2.428               
Total equity 15.395             16.589             20.367             23.168             25.707             28.639             31.705             34.367             36.209             38.138             39.555             40.991             42.487             
Long term borrowings 3.762               4.096               3.450               3.501               3.613               3.281               3.306               3.620               3.920               4.188               4.427               4.638               4.823               
Provisions 974                  998                  1.181               1.298               1.432               1.578               1.731               1.889               2.038               2.171               2.292               2.404               2.501               
Deferred tax 3.123               3.127               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               3.366               
Other non-current liabilities 3.324               3.168               4.033               4.314               4.751               5.225               5.723               6.237               6.721               7.155               7.546               7.912               8.229               
Non-current liabilities 11.183             11.388             12.031             12.479             13.162             13.450             14.127             15.111             16.045             16.881             17.631             18.320             18.919             
Short term borrowings 1.918               1.753               1.860               1.887               1.948               1.769               1.782               1.952               2.113               2.258               2.386               2.501               2.600               
Trade accounts payable 2.503               2.109               2.533               2.916               2.935               3.170               3.459               3.778               4.082               4.356               4.598               4.812               4.995               
Income taxes 349                  260                  522                  531                  609                  709                  802                  890                  973                  1.044               1.109               1.165               1.215               
Provisions 321                  348                  370                  430                  475                  524                  575                  628                  678                  723                  763                  800                  832                  
Other current liabilities 2.140               2.098               2.400               2.681               2.913               3.195               3.481               3.774               4.051               4.298               4.521               4.728               4.909               
Current liabilities 7.230               6.569               7.684               8.446               8.880               9.367               10.099             11.021             11.898             12.679             13.377             14.007             14.552             
Total liabilities 18.413             17.958             19.715             20.925             22.042             22.817             24.225             26.133             27.943             29.560             31.008             32.327             33.472             
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Appendix 8  - FCFF valuation results 
DCF Valuation results
LVMH - FCFF FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
FCFF 205 1.109 1.417 1.748 2.107 2.684 3.343 3.924 4.389 4.937
Terminal value 99.365
Discount factor 1,081 1,169 1,264 1,366 1,477 1,597 1,727 1,867 2,019 2,183
Present value of FCFF and Terminal value 190 948 1.121 1.279 1.427 1.680 1.936 2.102 2.174 47.789
Entreprise value 60.646             
Net debt 2.974               
Minority interest 1.006               
Equity value 56.666             
Number of shares 476.870.920    
Price per share (€) 118,83             
Hermès - FCFF FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
FCFF 122 403 452 524 584 662 752 845 934 1.013
Terminal value 19.463
Discount factor 1,084 1,174 1,272 1,379 1,494 1,619 1,754 1,901 2,060 2,232
Present value of FCFF and Terminal value 112 343 355 380 391 409 428 445 454 9.174
Entreprise value 12.490             
Net debt (cash) (801)                
Minority interest 13                    
Equity value 13.278             
Number of shares 105.162.445    
Price per share (€) 126,26             
 
Merged (no syn) - FCFF FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
FCFF 327 1.511 1.869 2.271 2.692 3.345 4.095 4.769 5.324 5.950
Terminal value 119.381
Discount factor 1,081 1,169 1,264 1,367 1,478 1,599 1,729 1,869 2,021 2,186
Present value of FCFF and Terminal value 302 1.292 1.478 1.661 1.821 2.093 2.369 2.551 2.634 57.340





Merged (syn) - FCFF FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
FCFF 327 998 1.189 2.691 3.174 3.884 4.721 5.483 6.155 6.773
Terminal value 137.118
Discount factor 1,081 1,168 1,263 1,365 1,475 1,595 1,724 1,863 2,014 2,177
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Appendix 9 - APV valuation results 





Number of shares 476.870.920
Price per share (€) 112,69
Operating cash flow
FCFF 205 1.109 1.417 1.748 2.107 2.684 3.343 3.924 4.389 4.937
Terminal value 94.872
Discount factor 1,084 1,174 1,272 1,379 1,494 1,619 1,754 1,901 2,060 2,232
Present value of FCFF and Terminal value 190 944 1.114 1.268 1.411 1.658 1.906 2.064 2.131 44.718
PV of FCFF 57.403
Tax shields
Net financial expense 151 156 129 91 52 36 55 59 78 90
Tax rate 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4%
Terminal value 593
Tax shield 52 54 44 31 18 12 19 20 27 31
Discount factor 1,084 1,174 1,272 1,379 1,494 1,619 1,754 1,901 2,060 2,232
Discounted tax shields 48 46 35 23 12 8 11 11 13 280
PV of tax shields 485
Constant capital structure ratio adjustment 1,031
Total PV of tax shields 500
Financial distress
Probability of default 0,50%
Expected bankruptcy costs (% of firm value) 10,0%
Expected bankruptcy costs 6.065
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Hermès - APV FY2009 H FY2010 H FY2011 F FY2012 F FY2013 F FY2014 F FY2015 F FY2016 F FY2017 F FY2018 F FY2019 F FY2020 F
Enterprise value 12.484             
Net debt (801)                
Minority interest 13                    
Equity value 13.272             
Number of shares 105.162.445    
Price per share (€) 126,20             
Operating cash flow
FCFF 122 403 452 524 584 662 752 845 934 1.013
Terminal value 19.463
Discount factor 1,084 1,174 1,272 1,379 1,494 1,619 1,754 1,901 2,060 2,232
Present value of FCFF and Terminal value 112 343 355 380 391 409 428 445 454 9.174
PV of FCFF 12.490
Financial distress
Probability of default 0,50%
Expected bankruptcy costs (% of firm value) 10,0%
Expected bankruptcy costs 1.249
Cost of financial distress 6
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FCFF 327 1.511 1.869 2.271 2.692 3.345 4.095 4.769 5.324 5.950
Terminal value 114.335
Discount factor 1,084 1,174 1,272 1,379 1,494 1,619 1,754 1,901 2,060 2,232
Present value of FCFF and Terminal value 302 1.287 1.469 1.647 1.802 2.067 2.334 2.509 2.585 53.892
PV of FCFF 69.893
Tax shields
Net financial expense 147 150 123 85 45 29 48 52 71 82
Tax rate 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4%
Terminal value 543
Tax shield 51 52 42 29 16 10 17 18 24 28
Discount factor 1,084 1,174 1,272 1,379 1,494 1,619 1,754 1,901 2,060 2,232
Discounted tax shields 47 44 33 21 10 6 9 9 12 256
PV of tax shields 448
Constant capital structure ratio adjustment 1,034
Total PV of tax shields 463
Financial distress
Probability of default 0,50%
Expected bankruptcy costs (% of firm value) 10,0%
Expected bankruptcy costs 6.989
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FCFF 327 998 1.189 2.691 3.174 3.884 4.721 5.483 6.155 6.773
Terminal value 130.154
Discount factor 1,084 1,174 1,272 1,379 1,494 1,619 1,754 1,901 2,060 2,232
Present value of FCFF and Terminal value 302 850 935 1.952 2.125 2.399 2.691 2.885 2.988 61.348
PV of FCFF 78.475
Tax shields
Net financial expense 147 150 123 90 48 31 52 56 76 88
Tax rate 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4%
Terminal value 581
Tax shield 51 52 42 31 17 11 18 19 26 30
Discount factor 1,084 1,174 1,272 1,379 1,494 1,619 1,754 1,901 2,060 2,232
Discounted tax shields 47 44 33 22 11 7 10 10 13 274
PV of tax shields 471
Constant capital structure ratio adjustment 1,034
Total PV of tax shields 487
Financial distress
Probability of default 0,50%
Expected bankruptcy costs (% of firm value) 10,0%
Expected bankruptcy costs 7.847
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